CHARLES PRICE AND SABRINA PRICE, APPELLANTS,
v.
ANTHONY RIZZUTI, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment in a motor vehicle accident liability case, holding that a traffic officer improperly testified to statements made by the defendant regarding where he made a U-turn, which statements were confidential under Florida law and inadmissible hearsay.
Yes, it was error. Statements made to an investigating police officer by a participant in an accident are confidential and not admissible under Florida Statute § 316.066, and the appellant's questioning of the officer did not waive the privilege. The error was not harmless because the officer's testimony contradicted all other evidence and was heavily emphasized in closing argument.
[1] Statements made to an investigating police officer by a participant in an automobile accident are confidential and not admissible in court.
[2] Allowing an investigating officer to testify regarding confidential statements made by an accident participant constitutes error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“statements made to an investigating police officer by a participant in the accident are confidential and not admissible”
Establishes the legal principle that accident participant statements to police are protected and cannot be admitted in evidence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharles and Sabrina Price were involved in an automobile accident with Anthony Rizzuti. The central dispute concerned where Rizzuti made a U-turn in f…
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PER CURIAM.
Reversed. The issue in this case is whether it was error to allow a traffic investigation officer to testify on cross-examination as to statements made by one of the participants in an automobile accident regarding where he made a U-tum in front of the appellant’s vehicle which precipitated the accident, the subject matter of this suit. We hold that it was error to allow the officer to testify to this, as statements made to an investigating police officer by a participant in the accident are confidential and not admissible. See § 316.066, Fla.Stat. (1987); Hammond v. Jim Hinton Oil Co., 530 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). We do not find that the appellant’s questioning of the officer waived the privilege.
The damaging point of the officer’s testimony was that it was contrary to both the testimony of the appellant and appellee as to where the appellee made his U-tum on the roadway. If the U-tum occurred where the parties said it occurred, the time for the appellant to react to the presence of the appellee’s vehicle was very short. On the other hand, if the U-turn occurred where the officer reported it, the appellant, who was found to be 60% at fault, would have had three blocks to observe the appellee’s vehicle before the crash. Even though the officer’s testimony was contrary to appellee’s testimony and all other evidence in the case, defense counsel capitalized on it, as there were no other disinterested eye witnesses to the accident. In closing argument, during his discussion of liability, he referred five times to the appellant having three blocks to observe appellee’s vehicle. Based on this emphasis on the inadmissible testimony in closing argument, we cannot conclude that it was harmless error to admit it, thus necessitating reversal for a retrial on the issue of liability. See Purvis v. Inter-County Tel. and Tel. Co., 173 So. 2d 679 (Fla.1965).
WARNER and KLEIN, JJ., concur. GLICKSTEIN, J., dissents with opinion.
[*98] GLICKSTEIN, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe that appellant waived the accident report privilege with respect to the location of appellee’s U-tum.
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Cited By
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Maingot v. DHSMV (9th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2008)…nal trial and not at an administrative hearing. See White v. Consolidated Freightways, Corp. of Delaware, 766 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vechicles v. Corbin, 527 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Price v. Rizzuti, 661 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). This argument is without merit. The accident report privilege exists to prevent the state from violating an individual’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination where he or she is compelled to answer questions from…
Authorities Cited
- Purvis v. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co., 173 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1965)
- Hammond v. JIM Hinton OIL Co., Inc., 530 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)