CLIFF PARNELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant's convictions for grand theft were vacated because he could not be convicted of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property for the same vehicles under Florida Statute section 812.025, though his dealing in stolen property and chop shop convictions were affirmed.
A defendant cannot be convicted of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property relating to the same property under section 812.025, Florida Statutes.
[1] A defendant may not be convicted of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property for the same property under section 812.025, Florida Statutes, and such issue may be r…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of three counts of grand theft and three counts of dealing in stolen property relating to the same three vehicles, and one cou…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was convicted of three counts of grand theft, in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes, and three counts of dealing in stolen property, in violation of section 812.019(1), Florida Statutes, relating to the same three vehicles. He was also convicted of one count of operating a “chop shop,” in violation of section 812.16, Florida Statutes.
We reject appellant’s arguments relating to the sufficiency of evidence to support his convictions; however, we agree that, under the circumstances of this case, under section 812.025, Florida Statutes, he cannot be convicted of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property as to the three vehicles. See Gray v. State, 611 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Rhames v. State, 473 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (given statute’s prohibitory language, not precluded from raising this issue on appeal even though no objection to erroneous instructions).
We therefore vacate appellant’s convictions for grand theft in counts I through III, and remand for correction of sentence to reflect that the grand theft convictions have been vacated, see Schummer v. State, 657 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
In all other respects, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
BOOTH, JOANOS and BENTON, JJ., concur.
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Mejia v. Jurich, 781 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…tatements of opinion or promises of future action, but rather must be based on a statement concerning a past or existing fact. Maunsell v. American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Baker v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 661 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), rev. denied, 669 So. 2d 252 (Fla.1996); Thor Bear, Inc. v. Crocker Mizner Park, Inc., 648 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). However, the courts have recognized exceptions to this rule which we find to be applicable in the instant…1 / 2
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Thompson v. The Bank OF NEW York, 862 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…); Thor Bear, Inc. v. Crocker Mizner Park, Inc., 648 So. 2d 168, 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (finding that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation is not actionable if premised on mere opinion and not material fact); Baker v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 661 So. 2d 128, 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (reasoning that for a claim of misrepresentation to be actionable, it must be of fact rather than opinion); Wasser v. Sasoni, 652 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding that seller’s statements that the building was “a…
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Golden v. State, 688 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…on for dealing in stolen property, but vacate the conviction for grand theft, and remand for correction of the sentence to reflect that the grand theft conviction is vacated. See Schummer v. State, 657 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Parnell v. State, 661 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Gray v. State, 611 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. ALLEN and MINER, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kennis Lee Schummer v. State, 657 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. White, 473 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Gray v. State, 611 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)