MICHAEL HANLEY AND CONSTANCE HANLEY, APPELLANTS,
v.
ROBERT J. KAJAK D/B/A BOBBY KAJAK PLUMBING, APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court reversed a trial court's finding that a subcontractor had a valid mechanic's lien and was entitled to statutory attorney's fees, holding that the subcontractor's failure to file a required contractor's final affidavit was not excused by the homeowners' prior commencement of litigation, though the court affirmed the award of money damages for work performed.
The court held that the commencement of an action by the Hanleys did not waive the statutory requirement that Kajak file a contractor's final affidavit as a condition precedent to maintaining a lien foreclosure action, and that filing the lien foreclosure as a counterclaim does not alter or excuse this statutory requirement. Accordingly, Kajak's failure to file the affidavit rendered the lien invalid.
[1] A subcontractor's failure to file a contractor's final affidavit as required by statute renders a mechanics' lien invalid absent good cause or justifiable excuse for nonc…
[2] The filing of a lien foreclosure action as a counterclaim does not waive the statutory requirement of filing a contractor's final affidavit as a condition precedent to ma…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Mechanics' liens are "purely creatures of the statute."”
Establishes the foundational principle that mechanics' liens derive solely from statute and must be strictly construed
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert J. Kajak, a plumbing subcontractor, performed work for Michael and Constance Hanley. The Hanleys commenced an action under section 713.21(4), F…
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PARIENTE, Judge.
We review the final judgment in which the trial court found a vahd mechanics’ hen in favor of the subcontractor Robert J. Kajak d/b/a Bobby Kajak Plumbing (Kajak), and awarded him money damages and statutory attorney’s fees against appellants Michael Hanley and Constance Hanley (Han-leys). We disagree with the trial court’s legal conclusion that the Hanleys’ commencement of an action pursuant to section 713.21(4), Florida Statutes (1993), resulted in a waiver of the requirement that Kajak file a contractor’s final affidavit pursuant to section 713.06(3)(d)(l) as a condition precedent to the maintenance of a lien foreclosure action pursuant to Chapter 713. The fact that the lien foreclosure action was filed by Kajak as a counterclaim does not alter the statutory requirement of 713.06(3)(d)(l) nor excuse noncompliance.
As stated by the supreme court in Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Buck, 594 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla.1992):
Mechanics’ hens are “purely creatures of the statute.” Shejfield-Briggs Steel Prods., Inc. v. Ace Concrete Serv. Co., 63 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla.1953). As a statutory creature, the mechanics’ hen law must be strictly construed. Home Elec, of Dade County, Inc. v. Gonas, 547 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla.1989).
Since Kajak has not shown good cause or justifiable excuse for his noneompliance with the statutory prerequisites, his failure to file a contractor’s final affidavit in a timely manner renders the lien invalid. See Timbercraft Enters., Inc. v. Adams, 563 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). See generally Holding Elec., Inc. v. Roberts, 530 So. 2d 301 (Fla.1988).
Because we do not find Kajak requested only equitable relief, compare M & M Investments, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 250 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), we affirm the award of money damages of $2,400 against the Hanleys based on the trial court’s findings of privity. See generally J. Batten Corp. v. Oakridge Inv. 85, Ltd., 546 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). However, we reverse the determination that the lien was valid and accordingly also reverse the award of statutory attorney’s fees against the Hanleys pursuant to section 713.29. See M &P Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Woods, 590 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 4th DCA), review dismissed, 589 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1991).
POLEN and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
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DELTA Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Onebeacon Ins. Co., 937 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…uirements of the construction lien law. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Buck, 594 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla.1992); Stresscon v. Madiedo, 581 So. 2d 158, 159 (Fla.1991); Johnson v. Aqua Pool Co., Inc., 725 So. 2d 458, 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Hanley v. Kajak, 661 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Thus, for example, section 713.08(5), Florida Statutes, requires a claim of lien to be recorded at any time during the progress of work or thereafter, but not later than 90 days after the final furnishing of the labor or service…
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City OF Coconut Creek v. City OF Deerfield Beach, 840 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…Fla. Wildlife Fed’n v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation, 390 So. 2d 64 (Fla.1980) (broadening of standing to seek enforcement of environmental law is substantive, not procedural). As such, the statute must be strictly construed. See Hanley v. Kajak, 661 So. 2d 1248, 1248-49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding that mechanics lien law as a creature of statute to be strictly construed).2 It should be applied as written, and not modified to reflect what the deciding authority thinks it should say. See City of Hollywood v…
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Burns v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 914 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…competent jurisdiction. Id. at 291. The Lemon Law Arbitration Board is a creature of statute, created by section 681.1095, Florida Statutes. As such, the Board’s authority must be strictly construed by reference to the statute. See Hanley v. Kajak, 661 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The statute authorizes the Board to hear Lemon Law claims; the statute does not authorize the Board to hear any additional consumer claims. See § 681 et seq, Fla. Stat. Further, section 681.112(3), Florida Statutes, states: “Thi…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Buck, 594 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1992)
- Sheffield-Briggs Steel Prods., Inc. v. Ace Concrete Serv. Co., Inc., 63 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1953)
- Marek v. Dugger, 547 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1989)
- Holding Elec., Inc. v. Roberts, 530 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1988)
- J. Batten Corp. v. Oakridge Invs. 85, Ltd., 546 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
- M & P Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Woods, 590 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Timbercraft Enters., Inc. v. Adams, 563 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- M & M Invs., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 250 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)