D.D.M., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A minor was adjudicated delinquent for sexual battery and lewd act upon a child. The appellate court reversed the adjudication and commitment for the lewd act charge because the same conduct cannot support both offenses, and reversed the commitments generally because the trial court failed to provide written reasons for adjudication and used a single disposition form for multiple offenses in violation of Florida law.
The court held that the adjudication for lewd act upon a child must be reversed because sexual battery and lewd act upon a child are mutually exclusive when based on the same conduct and no separate evidence supported the lewd act charge. The court also held that the trial court's failure to provide written reasons for adjudication and commitment violated the mandatory requirements of Florida Statutes § 39.052(3)(e) and that a separate disposition form must be used for each offense.
[1] Adjudications of sexual battery and lewd act upon a child, when based upon the same conduct, are mutually exclusive.
[2] A conviction for attempted sexual battery is mutually exclusive of a conviction for lewd act upon a child unless established by additional evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the adjudications of sexual battery and lewd act upon a child, when based upon the same conduct, are mutually exclusive”
Establishes that the trial court could not adjudicate the child delinquent for both crimes when they arose from identical conduct.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceD.D.M. was charged with five counts of sexual battery and one count of lewd act upon a child. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found…
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ANTOON, Judge.
D.D.M. was charged with five counts of sexual battery1 and one count of a lewd act upon a child.2 Following an adjudicatory hearing he was found to have committed one sexual battery (count I), one attempted sexual battery,3 a lesser-included offense (count II), and one lewd act upon a child (count IV). The trial court disposed of remaining counts by entering an “order granting the motion to dismiss in the nature of judgment of acquittal.” D.D.M. appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in three respects: (1) by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of lewd act upon a child; (2) by failing to give written reasons for adjudication and disposition; and (3) by using a single disposition form for all offenses. The state properly concedes error as to all three points. Accordingly, we reverse.
The state presented evidence sustaining the adjudication of delinquency as to the sexual battery charge, but there was no evidence of additional acts necessary to sustain the adjudication of delinquency as to the lewd act upon a child charge. In this regard, the adjudication of lewd act upon a child could not be sustained on the same evidence used to establish that D.D.M. committed the sexual battery because the adjudications of sexual battery and lewd act upon a child, when based upon the same conduct, are mutually exclusive. See State v. Hightower, 509 So. 2d 1078, 1079 n. 4 (Fla.1987); Chaplin v. State, 622 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Accord Fjord v. State, 634 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Walker v. State, 622 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Edwards v. State, 613 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Likewise, the crime of attempted sexual battery would be mutually exclusive of lewd act upon a child unless established by additional evidence. Thus, the adjudication and commitment for the charge of lewd act upon a child must be reversed. Next, although D.D.M. was committed, the trial court did not provide a statement of specific reasons for adjudication and commitment on the record or in writing. Section 39.052(3)(e), Florida Statutes (1993), provides:
If the court determines that the child should be adjudicated as having committed a delinquent act and that he should be committed to the department, such determination shall be in writing or on the record of the hearing. The determination shall include a specific finding of the reasons for the decision to adjudicate and to commit the child to the department.
This statute has been construed as requiring the trial court to provide a statement of specific reasons for adjudication of delinquency and commitment. The failure to do so is reversible error because the language of the statute is mandatory. M.S.M. v. State, 639 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Finally, D.D.M. argues that the trial court erred in using a single disposition form in committing him for all three offenses. We agree. A single order of disposition may not be used where multiple convictions constitute the basis for an adjudication of delinquency. T.A.R. v. State, 640 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
In summary, the adjudication and commitment on count IV are vacated. The commitments on counts I and II are vacated, and this matter is remanded with direction to the trial court to comply with section 39.052, Florida Statutes (1993), and to execute a separate disposition form with regard to counts I and II.
VACATED and REMANDED with directions.
HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . § 794.011(2), Fla.Stat. (1993).
. § 800.04(1), Fla.Stat. (1993).
.§ 777.04, 794.011(2), Fla.Stat. (1993).
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G.R.A. v. State, 688 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…that this court has consistently held that where multiple offenses constitute the basis for a delinquency adjudication, separate disposition orders for each offense must be used. M.L.B. v. State, 673 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); D.D.M. v. State, 662 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); T.A.R. v. State, 640 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). The basis for these holdings is that the court creates a general sentence when one disposition order is used. Dorfman v. State, 351 So. 2d 954 (Fla.1977). Although there is no…
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A.P. v. State, 718 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…the court erred and vacate the order of disposition. The court erred when it did not set forth its reasons for the adjudication and disposition, although, the statute, mandates compliance. See § 39.052(4), Fla. Stat. (Supp 1996); D.D.M. v. State, 662 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The court also erred when it disposed of the two charges in a single order of commitment. This court has held that a separate order must be used for each offense where multiple convictions form the basis for adjudication of deli…
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C.P. v. State, 669 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…equests this court to order correction of the order of disposition to reflect a maximum commitment of 60 days for the offense of criminal mischief under which Appellant was charged in case number 94-880. On remand, in agreement with D.D.M. v. State, 662 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), S.P. v. State, 664 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), and T.A.R. v. State, 640 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), a separate order of disposition should be entered to reflect the above stated maximum term of commitment. GUNTHER, C.J…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Hightower, 509 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1987)
- T.A.R. v. State, 640 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- D & D Hotdogs & Beef, Inc. v. Plantation Fountains Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 634 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Edwards v. State, 613 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Fjord v. State, 634 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Railton v. Robbie William Railton, 639 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Chaplin v. State, 622 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Walker v. State, 622 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)