THOMAS SWENSZKOWSKI, APPELLANT,
v.
WAYNE COMPTON, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DEBBIE LEE PHILLIPS, DECEASED, APPELLEE
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Thomas Swenszkowski appealed a trial court order barring his claim against the Estate of Debbie Lee Phillips based on the statute of limitations under Florida's probate code. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Swenszkowski's reimbursement claim for payments made after the decedent's death was not subject to probate claim procedures because it did not arise before the decedent's death.
Swenszkowski was not required to file a claim under the probate code's statutes of nonclaim because his claim did not arise before the decedent's death and cannot be deemed a liability of the decedent, as it arose well after her death. Therefore, the statute of limitations did not bar his action.
[1] A claim arising after the decedent's death is not subject to the nonclaim statute requiring timely filing of claims against the estate.
[2] A claim for reimbursement of an overpayment made by an insurance company to a hospital for services rendered to the decedent prior to death, where the overpayment is refu…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because Swenszkowski is not making a claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before her death, and because the action cannot be deemed a liability of the decedent, as it arose well after her death, the claim is not subject to the probate code's statutes of nonclaim.”
Establishes the core holding that post-death claims are not subject to probate claim procedures and statutes of limitations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSwenszkowski and the decedent Phillips purchased a home together while married. Swenszkowski had credit life insurance on Phillips. After Phillips die…
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ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND REHEARING
ERVIN, Judge.
This court’s previous opinion filed on August 21, 1995 is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted therefor, and appellee’s motion for clarification and rehearing is granted to the extent we have modified paragraphs two and three of the previous opinion.
This is an appeal from a final order finding that a claim asserted by appellant, Thomas Swenszkowski, against the Estate of Debbie Lee Phillips was barred by the statute of limitations. We conclude that Swenszkowski was not required to file a claim in order to prosecute his cause of action and therefore reverse.
The dispute involves a check Stur-divant Life Insurance Company issued for reimbursement of amounts Swenszkowski paid after the decedent’s death in connection with a home he and the decedent had purchased while married even though Swensz-kowski had credit life insurance on the decedent.1 The insurance company issued a reimbursement check made payable to the personal representative of the estate. Swensz-kowski failed to file his “claim” for the check within three months of publication of the notice of administration or within two years of the decedent’s death. Thus, the trial court held that the statute of limitations barred the claim. See §§ 733.702 & .710(1), Fla.Stat. (1989).
Because Swenszkowski is not making a claim or demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before her death, and because the action cannot be deemed a liability of the decedent, as it arose well after her death, the claim is not subject to the probate code’s statutes of nonclaim. See In re Estate of Kulow, 439 So. 2d 280, 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (insurer’s cause of action against personal representative for overpayment of benefits paid to hospital for services rendered to decedent was not a claim within meaning of probate code). And see Sperry v. Tammany, 106 Cal.App.2d 694, 235 P. 2d 847 (1951) (reimbursement of husband’s payment after wife’s death on mortgage executed by husband and wife on wife’s property). Cf. Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So. 2d 225 (Fla.1991) (claim involving decedent’s agreement to devise half of his estate to his ex-wife and children had to comply with probate claim procedures, because it involved an agreement which predated the decedent’s death).
REVERSED.
BENTON and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. . Swenszkowski is not seeking the insurance proceeds, which would have heen paid to the mortgagee, but rather is seeking reimbursement of payments he was not required to make after the decedent’s death by virtue of the credit life insurance. Thus, section 222.13(1), Florida Statutes (1989), does not bar Swenszkowski’s claim.
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Thompson v. Andrew K. Hodson, M.D., 825 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…the decedent’s estate that arose before her death, and because the action cannot be deemed a liability of the decedent, as it arose well after her death, the claim is not subject to the probate code’s statutes of nonclaim. Swenszkowski v. Compton, 662 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (citing In re Estate of Kulow, 439 So. 2d 280, 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)); see also Langford v. Ferrera, 823 So. 2d 795, 797 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (stating that claims for post-death expenditures “are not subject to the probate c…
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Langford v. Ferrera, 823 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…s no retroactive effect on the justici-ability of Appellant’s claim. Appellant also stated a justiciable claim for post-death expenditures, because such claims are not subject to the probate code’s statutes of nonclaim. See Swenszkowski v. Compton, 662 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); §§ 733.702 and 733.710, Fla. Stat. Because Appellant stated a justiciable defense based upon estoppel and a justicia-ble claim for-post-death expenditures, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees under…
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Coba v. Clay Craig, 881 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…ction cannot be deemed a liability of the decedent, as it arose well after [his] death, the claim is not subject to the probate code’s statutes of nonclaim.” Thompson v. Hodson, 825 So. 2d 941, 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)(citing Swenszkowski v. Compton, 662 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)); Langford v. Ferrera, 823 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). See Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So. 2d 225, 228 (Fla.l991)(interpreting § 73.702, Fla. Stat. (1985))(“reference to claims arising before the death of the decedent is inte…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991)
- In re The Est. OF Wilbur E. Kulow, 439 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)