NORMAN EUGENE JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed Jackson's sentence as a habitual offender because the trial court improperly imposed consecutive imprisonment and probation for crimes arising from a single criminal episode.
A trial court errs in sentencing a habitual offender to consecutive sanctions of imprisonment and probation for crimes arising from a single criminal episode.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by imposing consecutive sanctions of imprisonment and probation as a habitual offender when the underlying crimes arise from a single…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJackson was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine and sale of cocaine. The trial court sentenced him as a habitual offender t…
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PARKER, Acting Chief Judge.
Norman Eugene Jackson appeals his sentences for convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine and for sale of cocaine. We reverse the sentence.1
The trial court sentenced Jackson as a habitual offender to thirty years in prison for sale of cocaine to be followed by ten years’ probation for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. We conclude, and the state concedes, that the trial court erred in sentencing Jackson to consecutive sanctions of imprisonment and probation as a habitual offender for crimes that arose out of a single criminal episode. See Green v. State, 643 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Upon remand, we remind the trial court that it must advise Jackson orally at resentencing of any discretionary costs and special conditions of probation it seeks to impose. See Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc); Olvey v. State, 609 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
ALTENBERND and QUINCE, JJ., concur. . Jackson argued in his appeal that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry into his dissatisfaction with his counsel. Jackson raised this issue for the first time at sentencing. If the same attorney who represented Jackson at his trial and original sentencing represents him at his resentencing, we refer the trial judge to Judge Altenbemd's outline in Jones v. State, 658 So. 2d 122, 126-29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (Altenbemd, J., concurring), which suggests a line of questioning when a defendant complains about court-appointed counsel and implies that the attorney should be discharged.
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Citator
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Snelgrove v. State, 921 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2005)…and found no Brady violation. We affirm. Richardson mandates that once a discovery violation is revealed, the trial court must conduct an inquiry to determine the sanctions that should be imposed on the violating party. See, e.g., C.D.B. v. State, 662 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). While the State’s failure to disclose Matthews’ June 28 letter clearly violated its duty to disclose, this failure was not revealed until after the guilt phase was complete and the jury had issued its advisory recommendatio…
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Comer v. State, 730 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…kly at D2538; Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). A trial court’s failure to conduct a Richardson inquiry is subject to harmless error analysis. State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1995); C.D.B. v. State, 662 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (harmless error analysis is necessary where defense’s violation of discovery rule results in exclusion of defense witness without adequate Richardson inquiry). Where the error is of a constitutional nature, the State has the…
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Garfield Jones v. State, 32 So. 3d 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…earns of a possible discovery violation, in order to determine [*711] whether there has been an actual discovery violation. Landry, 9B1 So. 2d at 1065. It also applies even if the defendant does not request a Richardson hearing. See C.D.B. v. State, 662 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Sears v. State, 656 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Cf. Major v. State, 979 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that “[wjhere a defendant fails to timely object to a discovery violation or to request a Richardson he…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Fussell v. State, 658 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Porter v. State, 609 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Olvey v. State, 609 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Solomon Timothy Green v. State, 643 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)