CHARLES MORRAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1995-11-15
No. 94-03274
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.
662 So. 2d 1339 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1995) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Charles Morran appeals his convictions for trespass and grand theft. The appellate court affirms the convictions but reverses and strikes several improper cost assessments imposed by the trial court, finding they violated statutory procedures and limits.


Holding

The convictions are affirmed, but the court reverses multiple cost assessments: the $649 investigative costs, the $2 assessment, the $2000 fine and surcharge (unless reimposed under the correct statute), the excess portion of the section 27.3455(1) assessment over the statutory maximum, and the $368 medical expenses assessment.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court errs in imposing costs of prosecution without following the statutory procedure.

[2] A statutory cost assessment is improper if the cited statute does not apply to the offense.

Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Because the trial court imposed costs of prosecution without following the statutory procedure in section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1993), we reverse the investigative costs of $649.”

Establishes that investigative costs must comply with section 939.01 procedures; failure to do so requires reversal.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Charles Morran was convicted of trespass and grand theft. The trial court imposed various costs and fines including investigative costs of $649, a $2 …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
BLUE, Judge.

BLUE, Judge.

Charles Morran appeals from his convictions for trespass and grand theft. We affirm the convictions but agree with Morran that the trial court improperly assessed certain costs. Accordingly, we reverse the following costs.

Because the trial court imposed costs of prosecution without following the statutory procedure in section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1993), we reverse the investigative costs of $649. See Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111, 118-19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc). Additionally, we strike a $2 assessment. The written judgment cites section 943.25(8). This section does not apply. On remand, the state may seek reimposition of this cost under section 943.25(13) if it is properly announced. See Reyes, 655 So. 2d at 117.

The trial court imposed a fine of $2000 and an additional 5% surcharge. No statute was cited when the fine was announced, but the written judgment cited section 775.0835 for the fine and section 960.25 for the surcharge. Section 775.0835 authorizes additional fines when a defendant is convicted of a felony that resulted in the injury or death of another person. Because Morran’s convictions did not involve injury or death, the trial court erred in imposing a fine under this section. See Steele v. State, 575 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). If the statutory citation was a scrivener’s error and the trial court intended to impose this fine under section 775.083, which authorizes a fine of up to $5000 for a third-degree felony, the trial court may reimpose the fine and surcharge on remand.

The written judgment assessed $1024.10 per section 27.3455(1). We affirm the statutory maximum of $200 for Morran’s felony conviction and $50 for the misdemean-or. We strike the remainder. See Reyes, 655 So. 2d at 117.

Finally, the trial court assessed $368 for medical expenses incurred while Morran was in custody. We strike this assessment. Although a county may seek reimbursement for medical costs under section 901.35 or section 951.032, these statutes do not authorize the trial court to impose these costs as a condition of probation. See Comeau v. State, 611 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

In conclusion, we strike the investigative costs, the $2 cost, the fine and surcharge, the portion of the cost under section 27.3455(1) that exceeds the statutory maximum, and the medical costs. We affirm the remaining costs. On remand, the state may seek to reimpose appropriate costs.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Rivers v. State, 680 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
    …it appears that subsection (13) is the correct statutory authority. Further, the court did not pronounce the imposition of this discretionary cost. We strike this cost because of citation to the wrong subsection of the statute. See Morran v. State, 662 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The court orally pronounced a $300 fine, and the judgment states the statutory authority for this fine as section 775.0835, Florida Statutes (1993). It is improper to impose a fine under this section when the felony did not res…
  • Frazier v. State, 684 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
    …the imposition of $300 pursuant to section 775.0835 as that statute allows the imposition of a fine against a defendant who has been convicted of an offense involving death or injury and Frazier was not convicted of such an offense. Morran v. State, 662 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Accordingly, we affirm Frazier’s judgment and the order placing him on probation but strike the above-stated conditions. THREADGILL, C.J., and SCHOONOVER and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.…
  • …for the medical treatment of an arrestee. It also appears that a trial court is without authority to impose as a condition of probation, the requirement that probationer reimburse local government for his or her medical costs. E.g., Morran v. State, 662 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding that statutes authorizing county to seek reimbursement for medical costs do not authorize trial court to impose those costs as condition of probation); Comeau v. State, 611 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (holding that tria…

Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw