BARBARA B. COLLINS, APPELLANT,
v.
SALLY L. WILKINS, APPELLEE
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This case addresses whether a contingency risk multiplier can be used to calculate attorney's fees under Florida's offer of judgment statute. The appellate court held that it can, as the statute allows for consideration of all relevant criteria, including those outlined in the Rules of Professional Conduct which specify contingency as a factor.
Yes, a contingency risk multiplier can be considered when determining a reasonable attorney's fee under section 768.79, Florida Statutes. The statute permits consideration of all relevant criteria, including those specified in the Rules of Professional Conduct.
“She claims that the only factors which can be considered are those listed in the statute.”
This quote captures the appellant's main argument that the statute's listed factors were exclusive.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant challenged an attorney's fee award calculated using a contingency risk multiplier under section 768.79, Florida Statutes. The appellant …
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WARNER, Judge.
The appellant challenges an assessment of an attorney’s fee under section 768.79, Flori da Statutes (1993), the offer of judgment statute. She contends that a contingency risk multiplier cannot be used to calculate a reasonable fee under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, in this personal injury case. She claims that the only factors which can be considered are those listed in the statute. We disagree with this interpretation of the statute and affirm.
The statute provides:
When determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to this section, the court shall consider, along with all other relevant criteria, the following additional factors:
§ 768.79(7)(b), Fla.Stat. (1993) (emphasis supplied). The statute follows with enumerated additional factors for the court to consider. However, these are not exclusive but, as the statute says, must be considered with the other relevant criteria. Since the statute also refers the court to the guidelines promulgated by the supreme court in determining a reasonable fee, see section 768.79(6)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), we look to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4-1.5, Fees for Legal Services, for the factors to be considered in determining a reasonable fee. These include whether or not the fee is fixed or contingent. Rule 4 — 1.5(b)(8). The rule also specifies that all factors should be considered in setting a reasonable fee, “and may be applied, in justification of a fee higher or lower than that which would result from application of only the time and rate factors.” Rule 4-1.5(c). Therefore, we conclude that the legislature authorized a trial court to consider the application of a contingency risk factor as one criterion which may be applied in determining a reasonable fee under section 768.79. See also Standard Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 831 (Fla.1990).
Finding no error in the remaining issue raised, we affirm.
PARIENTE and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2003)…e Insurance Co. v. Sarkis, 809 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), which expressly and directly conflicts with Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Jensen, 752 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), review dismissed, 777 So. 2d 973 (Fla.2001), and Collins v. Wilkins, 664 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The petitioner, Sally Sarkis (Sarkis), was involved in an automobile accident, as a result of which she suffered damages. Sarkis brought an action against her insurer, re…1 / 4
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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sarkis, 809 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…’s fees awarded under the offer of judgment statute. Accordingly, we reverse the attorney’s fee award in this case and remand for the entry of an award based on reasonable hours and rates. We acknowledge conflict with Pirelli and Collins v. Wilkins, 664 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), rev. denied, 670 So. 2d 937 (Fla.1996). REVERSED and REMANDED. THOMPSON, CJ„ COBB, PETERSON, GRIFFIN, SAWAYA, PLEUS, PALMER and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur. HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opinion. . See Garrett v. Mohamm…
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Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Meta E. Jensen, 752 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…arding attorneys’ fees. The majority properly notes that two sister courts have decided that section 768.79(6)(a) authorizes a trial court to apply a multiplier in awarding attorneys’ fees under the offer of judgment statute. In Collins v. Wilkins, 664 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), and Garrett v. Mohammed, 686 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), the Fourth and Fifth Districts concluded that rule 4-1.5, Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, authorizes the multiplier’s use. Thus, by referring to the fee for legal se…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)