NED BLAND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A motion for postconviction relief is not the proper vehicle to compel the Department of Corrections to award gain time credits as ordered.
Appellant was sentenced for arson after violating probation. He sought administrative and provisional gain time credits against his sentence. The tria…
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W. SHARP, Judge.
Bland appeals from a summary denial of his second rule 3.800(a) motion, contending he is entitled to administrative gain time and provisional gain time credits against his twelve-year sentence for first degree arson, which was imposed after he violated his probation.1 He was first sentenced in 1988 before the effective date of the amendments to the statute which provides for forfeiture of gain time after revocation of probation. See Ch. 89-526, §§ 6, 8, 52, Laws of Fla. Thus, Bland is entitled to credit against his twelve year sentence for the entire seven years of his seven year sentence, although he served only 470 days.
The trial court directed the Department to award all gain time and county jail credit to Bland which he earned under the prior statute, for his first sentence. Bland’s claim that the Department has failed to properly award him provisional credit in violation of this order is not a proper subject for a rule 3.800(a) proceeding. Bland’s proper course should be to address this problem through an administrative hearing, or if necessary, through a mandamus proceeding. See Bowles v. State, 647 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Madden v. State, 651 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
AFFIRMED.
HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . In 1988, Bland was sentenced to seven years incarceration followed by one year probation. Bland served 470 days and was released from prison. After he violated his probation, Bland was resentenced to twelve years incarceration.
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Dep't of Corr. v. Mattress, 686 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…2d 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Henderson v. State, 632 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Reynolds v. State, 590 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Brown v. State, 427 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). See also § 921.161(2), Fla. Stat. (1995); Bland v. State, 664 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Grimes v. State, 657 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Conversely, a claim for presentence jail time credit is a matter for the trial court as a request for such credit affects the legality of the sentence. See Henderson; Reynolds…
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Speed v. State, 686 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…ent. If that remedy fails to obtain an award of the proper gain-time credit, Speed should file a petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court. See, e.g., Duggan v. Department of Corrections, 665 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Bland v. State, 664 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur.…
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Aguilar v. State, 756 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…ed in the court’s order, this is not a proper subject for a postcon-viction proceeding; defendant's proper course would be to address that problem through administrative hearing, or if necessary, through mandamus proceeding. See e.g. Bland v. State, 664 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Bowles v. State, 647 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bowles v. State, 647 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Madden v. State, 651 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)