SYLVESTER JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Sylvester Johnson appeals his 40-year sentence imposed as a habitual offender for attempted first-degree murder, a life felony. The court agrees that habitual offender enhancements cannot be imposed on life felonies under Florida law and reverses the sentence for resentencing.
A defendant convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as a habitual felony offender because the plain wording of Florida Statutes section 775.084 authorizes no extended term of imprisonment for life felonies.
[1] A defendant convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as an habitual felony offender.
[2] Statutory sentencing schemes may authorize enhanced penalties only upon career criminals who commit less serious felony offenses, but not upon those who commit the most s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as an habitual felony offender”
States the controlling legal principle that life felonies cannot receive habitual offender enhancements
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson was convicted of attempted first-degree murder with a deadly weapon, classified as a life felony. The trial court sentenced him to 40 years as…
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ANTOON, Judge.
Defendant, Sylvester Johnson, appeals his sentence of forty years as an habitual offender for the offense of attempted first degree murder, a life felony,1 arguing that habitual offender sanctions cannot be imposed as a part of a sentence on a life felony. We agree and reverse.
Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder with a deadly weapon, a life felony. The trial court sentenced him to serve forty years in prison as an habitual felony offender.2 After his conviction was affirmed by this court,3 the defendant sought post-conviction relief, arguing that the trial court erred in sentencing him as an habitual offender for a life felony. At a hearing on his motion the state and the trial court seemed to agree that the sentence was improper, but, perhaps due to the confusion created by his multiple offenses, defendant was again sentenced to forty years in prison as an habitual felony offender. Defendant again challenges the sentence, contending that it is improper. The question of whether a defendant may be sentenced as a habitual offender after being convicted of committing a life felony was answered in Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992). In Lamont, the supreme court recognized the confusion created by Florida’s statutory sentencing scheme wherein trial courts are authorized to impose enhanced penalties only upon career criminals who commit less serious felony offenses, but not upon criminals who commit the most serious offenses. Nevertheless, the Lamont court concluded that the plain wording of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), authorizes no extended term of imprisonment for life felonies. Accordingly, a defendant convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as an habitual felony offender. Having concluded that Lamont is controlling, we must reverse defendant’s sentence and remand this matter for resentencing as to the offense of attempted first degree murder with a firearm.4 With regard to other issues raised by the defendant, which are without merit, the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for resentencing.
DAUKSCH and W. SHARP, JJ., concur. . §§ 782.04(l)(a)l, 777.04(4)(c), and 775.087(1), Fla.Stat. (1989).
. See § 775.084, Fla.Stat. (1989).
. See Johnson v. State, 623 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
.In so ruling, we are mindful that the legislature has overruled Lamont, effective October 1, 1995. See Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346, 348, n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
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Carter v. State, 704 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…cation of a conviction to a life felony makes a defendant ineligible for sentencing as an habitual felony offender. See Moye v. State, 683 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). See also Mason v. State, 665 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Johnson v. State, 664 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). In Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992), the supreme court agreed with the majority of the district courts who had so held. The state again concedes this point, but nonetheless argues that defendant is not entitled to reli…
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Johnson v. State, 824 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…M. Sylvester Johnson appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). He contends that when he was resentenced on January 24, 1996, pursuant to our remand in Johnson v. State, 664 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), the scoresheet used to sentence him for attempted first degree murder with a deadly weapon erroneously included as additional offenses the two crimes for which he received habitual felony offender sentences. Including the two ad…
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Johnson v. State, 681 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…PETERSON, Chief Judge. This Anders appeal follows a resentencing pursuant to our remand in Johnson v. State, 664 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The problem remaining is that a scrivener’s error exists in the trial court’s classification of Johnson as a “habitual violent felony offender” with respect to Counts Two and Three. It is clear from the supplemented record that…
Authorities Cited
- Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1992)
- Hollice Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)