SUSAN R. GOODMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD M. GOODMAN, ET AL., APPELLEES
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's order denying a wife's motion for temporary alimony pending appeal, holding that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. The court clarified that temporary support pending appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c) does not require the heavy burden of proof needed for modification of judgments.
The trial court erred in applying the modification standard to a motion for temporary support pending appeal. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c) is not a substitute for modification proceedings and does not require the party to meet the heavy burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances.
[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction pending appeal in dissolution actions to enter orders awarding alimony necessary to protect the welfare and rights of any party pending…
[2] A party seeking temporary alimony pending appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c) is not required to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c) provides that pending appeal in dissolution actions, the trial court retains jurisdiction to "enter and enforce orders awarding ... child support, alimony, or other awards necessary to protect the welfare and rights of any party pending appeal...."”
Establishes the source of trial court authority to grant temporary support pending appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter a dissolution judgment was entered that included an alimony award, the wife filed a notice of appeal and sought temporary alimony pending appeal…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
We grant Appellani/wife’s motion to review an order denying her motion for temporary support pending appeal, and reverse the order. See Hilsman v. Hilsman, 421 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
After filing a notice of appeal from a dissolution judgment, which included an award of alimony, the wife sought temporary alimony pending appeal in an amount in excess of the award in the judgment. In denying relief, the trial court acknowledged that the standard it was applying in evaluating the wife’s motion was the test used in actions for modification of a judgment, thereby requiring the wife to demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred in the brief time subsequent to entry of the judgment.
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c) provides that pending appeal in dissolution actions, the trial court retains jurisdiction to “enter and enforce orders awarding ... child support, alimony, or other awards necessary to protect the welfare and rights of any party pending appeal....” Patently, this provision is not a substitute for a petition for modification under the statute. When a trial court temporarily alters the provisions in the final judgment for the purpose of protecting the welfare or rights of a party pending appeal, the terms of the judgment are not affected.
There is no reason to read into the rule a requirement that a party seeking temporary relief under it must meet the heavy burden established in modification proceedings. Although in Hilsman, the relief requested was a temporary reduction in the husband’s obligation pending appeal, the standards applied by the court should not differ simply because the relief needed is an increase, rather than reduction, in support. Here, the wife contends that a temporary award in excess of that provided in the judgment is just, as the alimony award in the judgment was “inextricably intertwined” with an equitable distribution, the benefits of which will be delayed until resolution of the appeal.
We emphasize that we give no consideration to the merits of the movant’s claim, but disapprove only of the test applied in reaching the court’s decision. Therefore, the order is reversed and we remand for further proceedings in the exercise of the trial court’s concurrent jurisdiction.
DELL, STONE and WARNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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McPHERSON v. McPHERSON, 775 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…he resolution of appeal. The trial court has the power to award alimony pending appeal in this case, if it finds that it is “necessary to protect the welfare and rights” of the former wife pending appeal. This case is similar to Goodman v. Goodman, 664 So. 2d 975, 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), where we recognized that under Rule 9.600(c) a court might properly award temporary alimony pending appeal in an amount in excess of the award in the judgment, where the. alimony award “was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a…
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Horowitz v. Horowitz, 139 So. 3d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…e 9.600(c), we have noted “[wjhen the trial court temporarily alters the provisions in the final judgment for the purpose of protecting the welfare or rights of a party pending appeal, the terms of the judgment are not affected.” Goodman v. Goodman, 664 So. 2d 975, 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (emphasis added); see also McPherson, 775 So. 2d at 974 (holding that the trial court has the power to award “temporary alimony” pending appeal “if it finds that it is ‘necessary to protect the welfare and rights’ ” of the m…
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Reidy v. Liudmyla Y. Reidy, 232 So. 3d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…ppeal. Id. at 974, We noted that a significant cash payment had been stayed until the resolution of the appeal, and stated that “[a] party’s ‘welfare’ piay well depend on receiving an equitable distribution.” Id. There, we cited Goodman v. Goodman, 664 So. 2d 975, 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), which “recognized that under rule 9.600(c), a court might properly award temporary alimony pending appeal in an amount in excess of the award in the judgment, where the alimony award “was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an…
Authorities Cited
- Merrill Enters., Inc. v. Barkett OIL Co. OF Fla., 421 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Hilsman v. Hilsman, 421 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)