STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES MCGRUDER, APPELLEE
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The State appeals a trial court's discharge of the defendant for alleged violation of Florida's speedy trial rule. The court reverses, holding that the state's compliance with the overall 15-day window for bringing a defendant to trial is what matters, not strict adherence to intermediate deadlines, and that the defendant was improperly discharged.
The court held that the defendant was improperly discharged. The state is entitled to a 15-day window from the filing of the speedy trial motion to bring a defendant to trial. Strict compliance with intermediate deadlines (the 5-day hearing requirement and the 10-day trial commencement requirement) is not mandatory if the overall 15-day period is met and no prejudice to the defendant is shown.
[1] A trial court's failure to conduct a hearing on a notice of expiration of speedy trial within five days of its filing is harmless error unless prejudice to the defendant…
[2] The fifteen-day period for bringing a defendant to trial after the filing of a motion for discharge, as provided by Rule 3.191(p)(3), is a "window of recapture" intended…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The intent of (i)(3) [now (p)(3) ] is to provide the state attorney with 15 days within which to bring a defendant to trial from the date of the filing of the motion for discharge.”
Establishes that the rule's overall time period is 15 days, which is the key metric for compliance.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcGruder filed a notice of expiration of speedy trial time on October 19, 1994, claiming 90 days had elapsed since arrest. The hearing on that motion …
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CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.
The state challenges an order discharging appellee for the state’s failure to bring him to trial within the proper speedy trial time. In these circumstances, however, we conclude that appellee was improperly discharged, and that the case be reversed and remanded to allow the charges to be reimposed.
Appellee filed a notice of expiration of speedy trial time on October 19, 1994, claiming ninety days had elapsed since the date of his arrest. The hearing on that motion was held two days later, on October 21,1994. On that date, appellee’s trial date was set for Nov. 3, 1994, a date that was thirteen days after the hearing on the motion. On November 1, 1994, appellee filed his motion for discharge, alleging that the state had not followed Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p)(3). The court granted the motion and discharged him.
Rule 3.191(p)(3) requires a hearing on a notice of expiration of speedy trial within five days of the filing of the motion and requires that trial be commenced within ten days of the hearing on the motion. The committee note specifically states: “The intent of (i)(3) [now (p)(3) ] is to provide the state attorney with 15 days within which to bring a defendant to trial from the date of the filing of the motion for discharge.” The trial court ruled here that because the ten-day period was extended to thirteen days, even though appellee was brought to trial within the total fifteen-day period allowed, the state had not complied with the rule, thus mandating appellee’s discharge. Our review of the cases interpreting this rule lead us to the opposite conclusion. Courts have generally held that the court’s failure to conduct a hearing on the motion within the initial five-day period is harmless unless there is some prejudice shown to the defendant. See Lasker v. Parker, 513 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); State v. Koch, 605 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Climpson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The reason for this rule is that it has been generally recognized that the “window of recapture” was created for the benefit of the state to allow it additional time to bring a defendant to trial. The committee note confirms this conclusion.
Although the instant case involves the second ten-day period, we can conceive of no reason to distinguish between the two so long as the trial is held within fifteen days and so long as there is no prejudice to the defendant alleged or proven. Here, the only reason that the ten-day period was extended by three days was that the original time for holding a hearing on the motion was shortened by three days. Indeed, it has been held that so long as the trial is commenced within the fifteen-day period and no prejudice is shown, the complete absence of a hearing on the motion within five days does not violate the rule. Climpson. Given that the total time allowed the state is fifteen days, and that that time period was met here, in addition to the fact that no prejudice was shown, we conclude that appellee was improperly discharged. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to allow the charges to be reimposed.
BLUE and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Salzero, 714 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1998)…PER CURIAM. We have for review Salzero v. State, 697 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (en banc), [*446] which certified conflict with State v. Driggers, 680 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); State v. McGruder, 664 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); and Climpson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. On February 11, 1996, Salvador Salzero was charged with possession of cocaine a…
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State v. Driggers, 680 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…o set the trial within ten days. Here, the trial court discharged Driggers because the case was set for trial fourteen days after Driggers filed his notice. We must reverse the trial court’s ruling based on this court’s opinion in State v. McGruder, 664 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).1 In McGruder, this court held that, absent a showing of prejudice, the defendant should not be discharged so long as the state brings the defendant to trial within fifteen days of the date of filing the notice of expiration of sp…
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Salzero v. State, 697 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…of the rule is controlling. . The First and Second District Courts have added a "showing of prejudice” requirement to the rule. State v. Driggers, 680 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d [*555] DCA 1996), rev. denied, 689 So. 2d 1069 (Fla.1997); State v. McGruder, 664 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Climpson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). We certify conflict with these decisions.…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Climpson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Lasker v. The Honorable James S. Parker & the Honorable John R. Blue, 513 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- State v. Koch, 605 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)