METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
STANLEY PRED, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS NATURAL GUARDIAN OF DAVID PRED, A MINOR; EUGENE H. LEONARD, AS NATURAL GUARDIAN OF JORDAN LEONARD, A MINOR; GERALDINE REID, AS NATURAL GUARDIAN OF QUINTASHA PATTERSON, A MINOR; AND MARCIA MORGADO, AS NATURAL GUARDIAN OF ALEJANDRA FERNANDEZ, A MINOR, APPELLEES
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The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision invalidating Dade County's Juvenile Curfew Ordinance, holding that the ordinance does not violate rights under the Florida or United States Constitutions. The court emphasized that juveniles possess fewer constitutional protections than adults due to their special status and vulnerability.
The ordinance does not violate any rights of the appellees or the minors under either the Florida or United States Constitutions. Juveniles do not enjoy the same quantum or quality of constitutional rights as adults due to their special nature and vulnerabilities, and the state has constitutional power to regulate for the well-being of children.
[1] Juveniles' constitutional rights are qualified by the recognition that they are always in some form of custody.
[2] Children do not possess the same quantum or quality of constitutional rights as adults due to their special nature and vulnerabilities.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the well-being of children is a subject within the state's constitutional power to regulate”
Establishes the state's authority to enact ordinances affecting juveniles
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn January 1994, Dade County Commission enacted a Juvenile Curfew Ordinance. In February 1994, appellees (parents and natural guardians of minors) fil…
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PER CURIAM.
In January of 1994, the Dade County Commission enacted the “Dade County Juvenile Curfew Ordinance”1 (hereinafter “Ordinance”).
In February of 1994, the appellees brought an action against the County seeking to invalidate the Ordinance based on their contention that the Ordinance violated several of their rights under Article I of the Florida Constitution.
The circuit court agreed and entered an Order finding the subject Ordinance unconstitutional under Article I of the Florida Constitution, specifically including Article I, Section 23.
Accordingly, the trial court permanently enjoined the enforcement of the Ordinance. The County appeals this Order, arguing that the Ordinance under review does not violate any of the appellees’ rights under the Florida Constitution.
We agree with the County and hold that none of the legal challenges to the Ordinance advanced by the various appellees are meritorious.
As far as the arguments of the juvenile appellees are concerned, it has long been established that “the well-being of children is a subject within the state’s constitutional power to regulate.” Griffin v. State, 396 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla.1981).
Additionally, juveniles’ rights “must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.” Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2410, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984).
Accordingly, under both the Florida and United States Constitutions, children, due to their special nature and vulnerabilities, do not enjoy the same quantum or quality of rights as adults. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla.1994); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 3043, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979).
Given this premise, we find that the Ordinance under review does not violate any alleged rights of minors under the Florida Constitution. Our view is consistent with the recent holding of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Sansbury v. City of Orlando, 654 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) wherein that court, relying on the authority of Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979), and Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla.1994), affirmed a trial judge’s order that denied a preliminary injunction2 against the implementation of a curfew ordinance in the City of Orlando, Florida.
To the extent that it could be argued that the subject Ordinance violates any of the appellees’ rights under the United States Constitution, we find that the Ordinance does not impermissibly impinge on any such rights. See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F. 3d 488 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied sub nom. Qutb v. Bartlett, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 2134, 128 L.Ed.2d 864 (1994); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242 (M.D.Pa. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 535 F. 2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964, 97 S.Ct. 394, 50 L.Ed.2d 333 (1976); accord In re J.M., 768 P. 2d 219 (Colo.1989) (en banc); People v. Chambers, 66 Ill.2d 36, 4 Ill.Dec. 308, 360 N.E. 2d 55 (Ill.1976); Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 193 Ill.App.3d 215, 140 Ill.Dec. 530, 550 N.E. 2d 12 (Ill.App.Ct.1990); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W. 2d 363 (Iowa 1989).
“If it appears that [an ordinance] does not violate the Federal or State Constitutions, then the legislative will is supreme and the duty of the court is to effectuate the policy of law as expressed in valid [ordinances].” Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 561-62,19 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla.1944) (Adams, J., concurring).
Accordingly, having determined that the Ordinance does not violate any of the appellees’ rights under either the Florida or United States Constitutions, we reverse the trial court’s Order which found the subject Ordinance to be unconstitutional and which, furthermore, permanently enjoined the enforcement of the said Ordinance. We remand the case to the trial court with directions to vacate the injunction and to enter an appropriate disposition, in favor of the County, consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
. Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Ord. 94 — 1 (1994).
. That injunction, as in the instant case, had been sought on grounds that included the contention that the ordinance violated Article I, Section 23, of the Florida Constitution.
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State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 2004)…d hold that this case does not implicate any fundamental right of minors to freedom of movement. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (articulating factors justifying treating minors and adults differently); Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred, 665 So. 2d 252, 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (noting that U.S. and Florida Constitutions do not give children “same quantum or quality of rights as adults”). Therefore, the correct standard [*1127] for determining the constitutionality of the juvenile ordinances is the…
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State v. T.M., 761 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…tailored in the least restrictive manner to achieve that interest. Various courts have upheld juvenile curfew ordinances against constitutional challenges when the ordinances have been properly drafted. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred, 665 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Sansbury v. City of Orlando, 654 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); People in Interest of J.M., 768 P. 2d 219 (Colo.1989). Other courts, including this court, have struck down such ordinances for being overly broad, vague, or for in…
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Authorities Cited
- Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (U.S. 1979)
- Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (U.S. 1984)
- Quarry Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994)
- Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands IN Said Dist. against which taxes have been assessed & Maurice Mountz, 154 Fla. 554 (Fla. 1944)
- Griffin v. State, 396 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1981)
- Zatko v. California, 429 U.S. 964 (U.S. 1976)
- Sansbury v. City OF Orlando, 654 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)