CAROL HOLM POWELL, APPELLANT,
v.
ROGER WARREN POWELL, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1996-01-10
No. 95-2298
Before GERSTEN, GODERICH and GREEN, JJ.
665 So. 2d 1146 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Carol Holm Powell appeals an order denying her request for attorney's fees in a post-divorce child support modification action. The court reverses, holding that the former wife's relocation to Virginia with the minor child was permitted under the settlement agreement and did not constitute the cause of litigation that would justify denying her attorney's fees.


Holding

The court reversed, holding that the former wife's relocation to Virginia was not inappropriate under the plain language of Paragraph 4(b) of the settlement agreement, which explicitly permitted the primary residential parent to remove the minor child from Florida without prior consent or court order. The General Master's finding was not supported by competent substantial evidence, and the former wife should be awarded attorney's fees.


Headnotes

[1] The primary criterion for an award of attorney's fees in a marital case is the financial resources of the parties.

[2] A party's financial status should not insulate them from the consequences of their conduct within the judicial system when determining attorney's fees.

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Key Quotes

“The primary residential parent shall be permitted to remove the minor child from the geographic boundaries of the State of Florida, without prior written consent of the other parent or court order.”

The plain language of the settlement agreement that explicitly permitted the former wife's relocation to Virginia

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties were divorced in 1989 with a settlement agreement giving the former wife (Carol) primary residential custody and explicit permission to re…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Carol Holm Powell, the former wife, appeals from an order denying exceptions to a General Master’s report. We reverse.

The parties were divorced in 1989. Pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement, that was incorporated into the parties’ dissolution of marriage decree, the former wife was named the primary residential parent. Paragraph 4(b) of the settlement agreement provided that “[t]he primary residential parent shall be permitted to remove the minor child from the geographic boundaries of the State of Florida, without prior written consent of the other parent or court order.”

The former wife filed a petition for modification of child support payments. During the pendency of this litigation, the former wife was seriously injured in an automobile accident. Because the former wife was no longer able to work and support herself, she relocated with the parties’ minor child to Virginia to live with her mother. The former husband filed numerous motions including motions for change of custody and for return of the minor child. These motions were resolved when the parties agreed to modify Paragraph 4(b) of the settlement agreement to provide that the former wife would remain in Virginia and would not permanently relocate from there.

Both parties filed motions for attorney’s fees resulting from the issues that were heard before the General Master. After, the General Master heard testimony as to the meaning of Paragraph 4(b), he found that the litigation “was precipitated largely by the mother’s inappropriate relocation without first attending to the required issues.” Based on this finding, the General Master recommended that each party pay their own attorney’s fees, even though he also found that the former husband’s income was significantly greater than the former wife’s income. The former wife filed exceptions to the General Master’s report. The trial court denied the exceptions, and ratified and approved the General Master’s report. The wife’s appeal follows.

The former wife contends that the trial court erred by ratifying and approving the General Master’s report thereby denying her motion for attorney’s fees. We agree.

The primary criterion for an award of attorney’s fees in a marital ease is the financial resources of the parties. § 61.16, Fla.Stat. (1993); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 628 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). However, “[a] party’s financial status should not insulate them [sic] from the consequences of their [sic] conduct within the judicial system.” Mettler v. Mettler, 569 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); see also, Armstrong, 623 So. 2d at 1218 (“A non-complying spouse’s contempt may be taken into account when the court determines an attorney’s fee award, but that does not remove the trial court’s responsibility to consider need and ability to pay.”). Further, in awarding attorney’s fees in a marital action, the trial court may consider “whether the modification or enforcement action brought or defended by the party seeking fees was meritorious or was litigated in good faith and whether the actions of one party compelled the other party to resort to the courts for a remedy.” Meloan v. Coverdale, 525 So. 2d 935, 937 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1988).

In the instant case, we find that the General Master’s finding that the former wife’s action of “inappropriately”' relocating to Virginia with the minor child was the cause of the litigation is not supported by competent substantial evidence. First, based on the plain language of Paragraph 4(b), the former wife’s action of relocating to Virginia without either the former husband’s or court’s approval was not “inappropriate.” Next, the former husband’s expert testified that even if the wife would have sought court approval prior to relocating, the difference in the time and cost involved in litigating this matter would not have been significant. Accordingly, we reverse the order under review and remand for an order awarding attorney’s fees to the former wife.

Reversed and remanded with directions.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Emmel v. Emmel, 671 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    …al non meritorious”1 nature of a party’s petition for modification which makes it necessary for the other party to incur fees is a factor that can be considered in gauging the issue of disparate financial status and ability to pay. Powell v. Powell, 665 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Mettler v. Mettler, 569 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). COBB, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur with the majority opinion’s affir-mance of the trial court’s denial of the petitions for modificat…

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