MOONLIT WATERS APARTMENTS, INC., PETITIONER,
v.
JOSEPH J. CAULEY, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that section 719.401(1)(f)1 does not apply to underlying land leases for cooperative apartment complexes, but only to leases of specific recreational or commonly used facilities. The court rejected Moonlit Waters' attempt to compel arbitration for the purchase of property underlying their cooperative apartment building.
No. Section 719.401(1)(f)1 applies only to leases 'of' recreational or commonly used facilities, not to underlying land leases 'including' such facilities. The statute does not apply to all-encompassing land leases and therefore did not give Moonlit Waters the right to compel arbitration for purchase of the leased property.
[1] A statute requiring a lease of recreational or other commonly used facilities to include an option to purchase does not apply to an underlying land lease that encompasses…
[2] Statutory construction requires looking to the plain meaning of the statute's language.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 719.401(l)(f)l applies to leases "of" recreational or other commonly used facilities, not to land leases "including" recreational or other commonly used facilities.”
Establishes the critical distinction in statutory language that determines the statute's scope
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMoonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. is a cooperative governing association for a 20-unit apartment building on three subdivision lots in Broward County wi…
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GRIMES, Chief Justice.
We have for review Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 651 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), wherein the district court of appeal certified the following question to be of great public importance:
WHETHER SECTION 719.401(l)(f)l APPLIES TO AN EXISTING LONG TERM GROUND LEASE ENTERED INTO AT ARM’S LENGTH UPON WHICH ALL IMPROVEMENTS OF A COOPERATIVE APARTMENT COMPLEX HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED.,
Id. at 1271. ]
We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. (Moonlit Waters) is the governing association of a twenty-unit cooperative apartment building with a pool, a dock, and parking areas, all on three subdivision lots on the east side of the intracoastal waterway in Broward County. Moonlit Waters has a 99-year ground lease, which commenced in 1965, providing for annual rental payments adjusted at ten-year intervals based upon changes in the consumer price index. Joseph J. Cauley is lessor of the property, as trustee for the owner. In 1991, Moonlit Waters informed Cauley that it wished to purchase the entire property, pursuant to section 719.401(l)(f)l, Florida Statutes (1991), which requires a lease of recreational or other commonly used facilities, entered into before the unit owners receive control of the association, to include an option to purchase. Cauley refused to enter into negotiations with Moonlit Waters to sell the property.
Moonlit Waters filed a motion to appoint an arbitrator to decide upon a sales price for the property, pursuant to section 719.401(l)(f)l. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the statute violated the United States and Florida constitutions. The court reasoned that appointing an arbitrator would violate Cauley’s due process rights by denying hhn the opportunity to retain property in which he has a vested right. The Fourth District Court of Appeal declined to reach the constitutional issue, finding that the statute applies only to a lease of recreational or other commonly used facilities, and does not apply to an all-encompassing underlying land lease. Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc., 651 So. 2d at 1270.
Section 719.401(l)(f)l provides in pertinent part: “A lease of recreational or other commonly used facilities entered into by the [cooperative] association or unit owners prior to the time the control of the association is turned over to unit owners other than the developer shall grant to the lessee an option to purchase the leased property....” In construing a statute, we look first to the statute’s plain meaning. Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992). Section 719.401(l)(f)l applies to leases “of’ recreational or other commonly used facilities, not to land leases “including” recreational or other commonly used facilities. The language of section 719.401(l)(f)l is unambiguous. Section 719.401(l)(f)l does not apply to land leases. The subject lease is a land lease encompassing all of the Moonlit Waters development, and is therefore beyond the scope of section 719.401(l)(f)l.
Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that section 719.4015(1), Florida Statutes (1993), specifically declares void, for public policy reasons, “the inclusion or enforcement of escalation clauses in land leases or other leases or agreements for recreation facilities, land or other commonly used facilities.” Section 719.401(l)(f)l makes no reference to land leases. Under the principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exelusio alteri-us, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. Bergh v. Stephens, 175 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA1965).
Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and approve the decision of the court below.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
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State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2002)…fe, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998). Further, we have explained that when the Court construes a statute, “we look first at the statute’s plain meaning.” Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla.1996). As noted, the trial court elected to treat J.M. as a delinquent child under the provisions of section 985.227(3) (c), Florida Statutes (1999) which states: When a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution as an adult and…
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Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 898 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004)…. See State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998). In determining that intent, we have explained that “we look first to the statute’s plain meaning.” Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla.1996). Normally, “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambig-. uous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be gi…
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Young v. Progressive Se. Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2000)…insured motorists is not among this list. See § 627.727(9). “Under the principle of statutory construction, ex-pressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion-of another.” Moonlit Waters Apartments Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla.1996). By failing to permit self-insured motorist policy exclusions in the list of authorized exclusions, the Legislature has further indicated its intent in section 627.727 not to permit self-insured motorist policy exclusions. Finally,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1992)
- Bergh v. Hinson L. Stephens, 175 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Moonlit Waters Apts., Inc. v. Cauley, 651 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)