P.D., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
P.D., a juvenile, appeals his adjudication of delinquency for committing a lewd and lascivious act. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, rejecting challenges to the charging petition, sufficiency of evidence, admission of child hearsay testimony, constitutional validity of the hearsay statute, and the denial of a motion to suppress.
The trial court properly denied dismissal despite the broad time frame consistent with DelVOrfano v. State; evidence was sufficient for conviction; child hearsay was properly admitted with sufficient indicia of reliability under § 90.803(23) without requiring a competency determination, which is correct under Perez v. State; the hearsay statute is constitutional under State v. Townsend; and the suppression motion was properly denied.
[1] A petition alleging a time frame of twenty-eight months for the commission of a lewd and lascivious act is not subject to dismissal when the victim is a young child and t…
[2] Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction when it meets the legal standard for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of P.D.'s motion to dismiss, and conclude that the trial court's ruling was consistent with the Florida Supreme Court's decision in DelVOrfano v. State”
Establishes that broad time frames in charging petitions involving young child victims are permissible
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceP.D. was adjudicated delinquent for committing a lewd and lascivious act against a young child victim. The charging petition alleged a twenty-eight mo…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Child Witness Competency cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
P.D. appeals an adjudication of delinquency for commission of a lewd and lascivious act. We affirm.
P.D. contends that the petition should have been dismissed because it alleged a twenty-eight month time frame during which the charged lewd and lascivious act occurred. As the victim was a young child, the State was unable to narrow the time frame to a shorter period. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of P.D.’s motion to dismiss, and conclude that the trial court’s ruling was consistent with the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in DelVOrfano v. State, 616 So. 2d 33, 36-36 & n. 5 (Fla.1993).
As to the second point on appeal, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict.
As the third issue, P.D. contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence child hearsay pursuant to subsection 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1991). The trial court’s written order indicates that it considered the correct factors under subsection 90.803(23), and in our view the order is consistent with Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla.1988), cert, denied, 492 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 3253,106 L.Ed.2d 599 (1989), as well as the later-announced decision in State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1994).
P.D. asserts that the trial court refused to consider the competency of the child in deciding whether the child hearsay was reliable. We think that P.D. misreads the trial court’s order and the proceedings below. P.D.’s argument prior to trial was that the child victim’s hearsay statements could not be admitted unless there was a finding that the child was competent. That is an incorrect statement of law and the trial court correctly rejected it. See Perez, 536 So. 2d at 210-11.
The trial court’s order, entered at the start of the trial, indicates that the court had not interviewed the child and could not assess “present competency.” In this case the trial court had made a pretrial determination that the child victim was unavailable to testify at trial because of a finding that the child’s participation in the trial would result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm. See § 90.803(23)(a)2.b., Fla. Stat. Since the child victim was unavailable to testify at trial, there was no necessity to make a determination of competency to testify at trial.
Elsewhere in the same order, the trial court found that “the child did not appear to be competent at the time of the incident.” The trial court did not make a specific determination whether the child was competent at the subsequent date that the child made her statements to the third party witnesses. However, read in full context the trial court was proceeding on the premise that the child victim was not competent at the pertinent times. The court nonetheless found that the child hearsay statements had sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted under the statute, notwithstanding the child’s lack of competence. This is a correct application of the case law, see Perez, 536 So. 2d at 210-11, and there is adequate evidentiary support for the trial court’s determination.
As the fourth issue, P.D. challenged the constitutionality of subsection 90.803(23), Florida Statutes. We reject that point on authority of State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 956-58.
As to the final point on appeal, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of P.D.’s motion to suppress the statement he gave to the police.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Eliseo G. Saldana v. State, 980 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…denying his motion for a statement of particulars, and failing to use a special verdict form with interrogatories. We review the denial of a motion to dismiss for an allegedly defective charging document for abuse of discretion. See P.D. v. State, 666 So. 2d 968, 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(k)(5) permits disjunctive or alternative allegations for an offense that may be committed by one or more of several means or acts. Rule 3.140(o) provides that no motion to dismiss for…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994)
- Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Knickerbocker, 616 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1993)
- Williamson v. Buckingham, 492 U.S. 923 (U.S. 1989)
- Corbit v. Denley, 492 U.S. 923 (U.S. 1989)