LARRY STRICKLER, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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In this workers' compensation appeal, the court affirmed the Judge of Compensation Claims' decision to deny benefits to Larry Strickler, finding that his automobile accident was not compensable because it was a subsequent intervening accident unrelated to his industrial injury and not within the course and scope of his employment.
The court affirmed the JCC's decision, holding that the JCC has discretion to judge witness credibility and reject testimony he disbelieves, and that the automobile accident was properly found to be a subsequent intervening accident outside the course and scope of employment.
[1] A Judge of Compensation Claims has the discretion to judge the credibility of witnesses and reject testimony that the judge disbelieves.
[2] A Judge of Compensation Claims is free to reject, in whole or in part, even uncontroverted testimony which the Judge disbelieves.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The JCC had the discretion to judge the credibility of witnesses and reject testimony which he disbelieved.”
Establishes the foundational principle that the JCC, as finder of fact, has broad discretion in evaluating witness credibility.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaimant Strickler suffered an industrial accident and claimed that while traveling to see his doctor about that injury, he was involved in an automob…
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KAHN, Judge.
Claimant Larry Striekler challenges a workers’ compensation order in which the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) (1) rejected claimant’s testimony that he was on his way to see his doctor for his industrial accident when he was involved in an automobile accident, (2) found claimant’s automobile accident was not an accident or injury arising out of or in the course and scope of his employment and was a subsequent intervening accident, and (3) denied benefits. We affirm the JCC’s order. The JCC had the discretion to judge the credibility of witnesses and reject testimony which he disbelieved. Ullman v. City of Tampa Parks Department, 625 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Storage Technology Corp. v. Philbrook, 448 So. 2d 42, 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); John Caves Land Development Co. v. Suggs, 352 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla.1977).
Appellant relies on Bass v. General Motors Corp., 637 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), for the proposition that the JCC abused his discretion in rejecting claimant’s testimony. In Bass, this court found the JCC abused his discretion in rejecting claimant’s testimony because “the discrepancies in claimant’s testimony are of no weight in determining whether or not an accident occurred at all.” 637 So. 2d at 306. Claimant in Bass stated on the day of the accident and at the hearing that he injured his back lifting a box containing a “support.” He allegedly told his supervisor and the worker’s compensation clerk and stated on his accident report and during deposition that he injured his back while lifting a box containing a “door panel.” Both items weighed 55 pounds, and claimant’s supervisor admitted that it was possible that door panels were shipped in boxes similar to those containing supports. This court found the minor inconsistency in testimony irrelevant to the claim.
This court in Bass recognized the case was unusual and reiterated the general rule, which controls the present case:
We are quite cognizant of our standard of review: a JCC’s findings are to be sustained if it is permitted by any view of the evidence and its possible inferences. Gomez v. Neckwear, 424 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The JCC, as the finder of fact, has the prerogative of disbelieving a witness. The JCC is free to reject, in whole or in part, even uncontroverted testimony which the JCC disbelieves. Storage Technology Corp. v. Philbrook, 448 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Ullman v. City of Tampa Parks Department, 625 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
637 So. 2d at 306.
AFFIRMED.
BARFIELD and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
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Singletary v. Yoder's & Ameritrust Ins. Corp., 871 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…pparent from the record. The JCC, in the exercise of its discretion, determined that Claimant was not a credible witness and, based on this determination, held that Claimant was guilty of worker’s compensation fraud. Strickler v. Fla. Power Corp., 667 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). However, the JCC’s ruling on Claimant’s credibility is not sufficient, in and of itself, to support the conclusion that Claimant knowingly and intentionally made false statements to obtain worker’s compensation benefits. Wheneve…
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Hale v. Shear Express, Inc., 946 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…s in billable time is irrelevant to our review on appeal. Moreover, the majority has ignored this Court’s previous recognition that “[t]he JCC, as the finder of fact, has the prerogative of disbelieving a witness.” Strickler v. Florida Power Corp., 667 So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In specifically recognizing this axiomatic function of being the fact finder, this Court has further stated that “[t]he JCC is free to reject, in whole or in part, even uncontroverted testimony which the JCC disbelieves.” I…
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Jackson v. Ryan's Fam. Steak House & Zurich-American Ins., 27 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…C, a trained jurist who presided over the underlying substantive claim in question, was shocked by the evidence, and found the resulting fee requested to be illogical, incredible, and unconscionably excessive. See e.g. Strickler v. Fla. Power Corp., 667 So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“[t]he JCC as the finder of fact has the prerogative of disbelieving a witness.”). In fact, he found that “little time and effort should be required to prosecute a mileage reimbursement claim as was at issue herein.” The E/…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ullman v. City OF Tampa Parks Dep't & Alexsis, 625 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- John Caves Land Dev. Co. v. Suggs, 352 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1977)
- Cili v. State, 424 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Gomez v. Neckwear, 424 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Storage Tech. Corp. & Travelers Ins. Co. v. Philbrook, 448 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Bass v. Gen. Motors Corp., 637 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)