JEFFERY EIDSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jeffery Eidson appealed his probation violation sentence, challenging the discrepancy between the trial judge's oral pronouncement and the written sentencing order. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the oral sentence prevails and remanding for entry of a corrected written order reflecting one year in county jail followed by two years' probation, with Eidson entitled only to credit for time actually served.
The court held that the oral pronouncement of sentence prevails over the written order, requiring entry of a corrected written sentencing order reflecting one year in county jail followed by two years' probation. Eidson is entitled to credit for jail time actually served but not to gain time, provisional credits, or administrative gain time. The special condition requiring 364 days in jail must be deleted and the probation term reduced from three to two years.
[1] The oral pronouncement of a sentence prevails over a written judgment and sentence form.
[2] A written sentencing order must conform to the court's oral pronouncement of sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is a settled rule of law that oral pronouncement of sentence prevails over the written judgment and sentence form”
Establishes the legal principle governing the conflict between oral and written sentencing orders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEidson committed grand theft on October 4, 1990, and was sentenced to twenty-two months in prison followed by probation. He later violated his probati…
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PER CURIAM.
Jeffery Eidson (Eidson) committed grand theft on October 4, 1990, for which he was sentenced to twenty-two months in prison, followed by probation. Eidson violated his probation and now appeals his postviolation-of-probation sentence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The trial judge orally sentenced Eid-son to one year in the county jail followed by two years’ probation, consecutive to any sentence Eidson presently is serving.1 No sentencing order appears in the record; the record however includes a probation order imposing three years’ probation, with the special condition that Eidson spend the first 364 days in the county jail. We therefore remand for entry of a written sentencing order that conforms to the court’s oral pronouncement of one year in the county jail followed by two years’ probation. Armstead v. State, 612 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (“[I]t is a settled rule of law that oral pronouncement of sentence prevails over the written judgment and sentence form.”). We also remand for correction of the probation order by deleting the special condition that 364 days be served in the county jail, and for reduction of the term of probation from three years to two years, commencing upon the expiration of Eidson’s jail sentence.
Eidson in addition is entitled to credit for “jail time actually served.” Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941, 942 n. 2 (Fla.1993). He is not entitled to gain time, provisional credits, or administrative gain time however.2 Id. (Credit for time served “does not include ‘provisional credits’ or ‘administrative gain time’ which is used to alleviate prison overcrowding and is not related to satisfactory behavior while in prison”; furthermore, chapter 89-531, which became effective on October 1, 1989, “now serves to forfeit any gain time previously earned.”); ch. 89-531, §§ 13, 19, Laws of Fla.; § 948.06(6), Fla.Stat. (1989).
We thus remand for consistent proceedings.
ERVIN, WOLF and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur. . The oral sentence includes previously imposed conditions, including restitution, not at issue here.
. Eidson committed his original crime, grand theft, after the October 1, 1989 effective date of a gam-time-forfeitmg law. Ch. 89-531, §§ 13, 19, Laws of Fla.
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Citator
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Stanton Larry Hamer v. State, 682 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…e imposed thereon, but remand for correction of certain errors in the written order of revocation. First, the trial court erred in failing to conform its written sentencing order to its oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing. Eidson v. State, 667 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The trial court orally sentenced Hamer to six years imprisonment with credit for jail time, as well as credit for all time previously served and unforfeited gain time.1 When the written order issued, however, it made no mention…
Authorities Cited
- Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993)
- Armstead v. State, 612 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)