PHYLLIS ANN STEPHENS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Phyllis Ann Stephens appealed the cost assessments and one sentence imposed following her no-contest plea to three charges. The court reversed and remanded for correction of the sentence imposed on a second-degree misdemeanor count and for removal of duplicative per-count costs that should have been assessed on a per-case basis.
The court held that statutory costs must be assessed on a per-case basis, not per count, and therefore duplicative costs assessed to counts two and three must be stricken. The $25 additional court costs must be stricken unless statutory authority is provided. The one-year sentence on the second-degree misdemeanor count must be reversed because the statutory maximum penalty for such misdemeanor is 60 days.
[1] A defendant's absence from a bench conference during jury challenges does not constitute reversible error if the relevant case law predates the defendant's trial and the…
[2] A sentence exceeding the statutory maximum for a second-degree misdemeanor offense is improper, even if it does not extend actual incarceration.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In Hunter, this court held that statutory costs must be assessed on a per case, rather than a per count, basis.”
Establishes the controlling legal rule that duplicative per-count costs must be struck
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStephens was charged with three offenses committed on November 30, 1993: a third-degree felony, a first-degree misdemeanor, and a second-degree misdem…
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JOANOS, Judge.
Appellant, Phyllis Ann Stephens, appeals the per count cost assessments, and one of the sentences imposed upon her plea of no contest to three charges. We reverse and remand for correction of the sentence and the cost assessments.
Appellant was charged in a three-count information with committing a third-degree felony, a first-degree misdemeanor, and a second-degree misdemeanor; all offenses were committed on November 30, 1993. At sentencing, the trial court adjudicated guilt as to all three counts. The court imposed the maximum permitted sentence of 3½ years as to the count one third-degree felony, and imposed a sentence of one year as to each misdemeanor, all sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court orally imposed “statutory fee and costs of $261.00” as to the felony, and statutory fee and costs of $134.00 as to each misdemeanor. The written “Charges/Costs/Fees” documents assess costs separately for each count.
The state recognizes that the costs issue was addressed by this court in Hunter v. State, 651 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Since the Hunter opinion was released after the sentencing proceeding in this case, the trial court did not have the benefit of the rule announced in that ease. In Hunter, this court held that statutory costs must be assessed on a per ease, rather than a per count, basis. Therefore, the duplicative costs assessed as part of the sentences for counts two and three must be stricken. “Additional Court Costs” in the amount of $25.00 also were imposed as part of the sentence for counts two and three, but not as to count one. Since no statutory authority was provided for imposition of this cost, it, too, must be stricken, unless authorized by statute. If, upon remand, reference is made to statutory authority to support the $25.00 “Additional Court Costs,” the cost may be assessed on a per case basis.
The state also recognizes that appellant was charged with, and pled no contest to, the second-degree misdemeanor of driving while license was suspended. Since the maximum penalty for a second-degree misdemeanor is 60 days, see § 775.082(4)(a) and (b), Fla.Stat. (1993), the one-year sentence imposed on this count must be reversed.
Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s convictions, but remand this cause with directions to strike the duplicative costs imposed as part of counts two and three, to furnish statutory authority for the Additional Court Cost or strike that assessment, and to correct the judgment and sentence imposed as to the count charging a second-degree misdemeanor. BOOTH and BENTON, JJ., concur.
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Brenton McNeil v. State, 215 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 2017)…v. State, 705 So. 2d 970, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Van Vorous v. State, 696 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Seeker v. State, 674 So. 2d 853, 853 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Neal v. State, 669 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Stephens v. State, 667 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Smith v. State, 661 So. 2d 378, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Renaud v. State, 660 So. 2d 408, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Nguyen v. State, 655 So. 2d 1249, 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)).…
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Rafael v. State, 679 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…icken because no statutory authority was cited to support this cost. See Watson v. State, 667 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). On remand, the court may reimpose this cost if it cites the statutory authority for that assessment. See Stephens v. State, 667 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Bradshaw v. State, 638 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In all other respects, the judgments and sentences are affirmed. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED and REMANDED with directions. MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.…
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Brenton McNEIL v. State, 162 So. 3d 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…case.”); Seeker v. State, 674 So. 2d 853, 853 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Because the trial court imposed costs on a per count basis, however, we strike the duplicative costs.”); Neal v. State, 669 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Stephens v. State, 667 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Smith v. State, 661 So. 2d 378, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“[C]osts must be imposed on a per-case basis.”); Renaud v. State, 660 So. 2d 408, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Nguyen v. State, 655 So. 2d 1249, 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hunter v. State, 651 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)