LEONARDO PEREZ FAGUNDO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed denial of collateral relief for illegal sentence where defendant's 22-year sentence with life probation for second-degree murder exceeded sentencing guidelines but remained within the statutory maximum for the offense.
A sentence that exceeds sentencing guidelines but remains within the statutory maximum for the offense is not illegal under Rule 3.800(a), and failure to provide written reasons for departure cannot be raised for the first time in collateral proceedings.
[1] A sentence that exceeds sentencing guidelines but remains within the statutory maximum for the offense is not illegal under Rule 3.800(a) and cannot be challenged in coll…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines.”
Court defining what constitutes an illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a)
Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder with a firearm and sentenced to 22 years followed by life probation. The sentence exceeded the guideli…
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant appeals an order partially granting defendant’s motion to correct illegal sentence, pursuant to Rule 3.800.
The defendant’s motion requested relief from an illegal sentence on two grounds. The first ground, that he had been allotted the incorrect amount of jail time served, was stipulated to by the state, and the circuit court entered an order granting relief. The second ground stated is that the trial court exceeded the permitted guideline range of seven (7) to' twenty-two (22) years by imposing a sentence of twenty-two (22) years followed by life probation, without giving reasons for departure.
The defendant’s sentence does exceed the permitted guideline range calculated on his scoresheet. However, the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for second degree murder with a firearm, which is a felony of the first degree and is punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. §§ 775.082; 782.04 Fla.Stat. (1991). So, the sentence is not illegal within the meaning of rule 3.800(a). An illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines. See Gartrell v. State, 626 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.1993). This is not a “fundamental” error that may be raised at any time, since the sentence is within the maximum period allowed by law. See Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1995). Therefore, the failure of the trial judge to provide written reasons for a departure sentence may not be raised for the first time in a collateral relief proceeding.
Affirmed.
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State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2003)…ea colloquy should be resolved based on a rigid definition of direct versus collateral consequences.” 814 So. 2d at 431. Moreover, the decisions finding offender registration to be collateral consequences of a plea largely rely on Benitez v. State, 667 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). See, e.g., State v. Stapleton, 764 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000);5 Oce v. State, 742 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); LaMonica v. [*1047] State, 732 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The court in Benitez held in a very brief opinio…
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Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…dom from multiple punishments for the same offense). Plea Bargain Collie asserts that the sexual predator designation constitutes a breach of contract because it imposes punishment beyond that to which he contractually agreed. In Benitez v. State, 667 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), the Third District Court held that the sexual predator designation was a collateral consequence of the guilty plea and the court was not required to advise the defendant of this consequence during the plea colloquy. We agree. Ad…
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Woods v. State, 714 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED on the authority of Benitez v. State, 667 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). DAUKSCH, HARRIS and PETERSON, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1995)
- Gartrell v. State, 626 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1993)