JACQUES F. GOLDEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jacques Golden appeals his cocaine conviction sentences, challenging the use of video hookup sentencing, imposed costs, and probation conditions. The court affirmed the sentencing method and most costs but reversed the imposition of investigation costs and drug-testing conditions that lacked proper oral pronouncement.
The court affirmed that video hookup sentencing was proper when proper waivers were executed and all parties could communicate. The court affirmed imposition of court costs ($255) and attorney's fees ($300), but reversed the $134 investigation costs because they were imposed without state request and proper documentation as required by statute. The court reversed the probation and community control conditions requiring drug-testing payment because they were not orally pronounced at sentencing.
[1] A defendant may consent to sentencing via closed-circuit video hookup, provided that the precautions outlined in Scott v. …
[2] A sentencing judge lacks the authority to impose investigative costs without a request from the state, even if the defendant and counsel do not object at the sentencing h…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The sentencing judge and the prosecutor remained at the courthouse and all parties had an ability to speak with and see each other. The appellant had also signed a written waiver consenting to sentencing via video hookup. The precautions outlined in Scott v. State, 618 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), were taken here and we see no reason why such sentencing cannot be done via closed-circuit video hookup as long as the proper waivers were executed as was done here.”
Establishes the court's holding that video hookup sentencing is permissible when proper procedural safeguards and waivers are in place.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGolden was convicted of two counts of sale of cocaine and two counts of possession of cocaine. He was sentenced via closed-circuit video hookup while …
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PER CURIAM.
Jacques F. Golden appeals his sentence for two counts of sale of cocaine and two counts of possession of cocaine as well as the imposition of certain conditions of probation and costs. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
We find no error as to his claim that it was error to sentence him via a closed-circuit video hookup. The sentencing judge held the hearing while the appellant was accompanied by his counsel at the jail. The sentencing judge and the prosecutor remained at the courthouse and all parties had an ability to speak with and see each other. The appellant had also signed a written waiver consenting to sentencing via video hookup. The precautions outlined in Scott v. State, 618 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), were taken here and we see no reason why such sentencing cannot be done via closed-circuit video hookup as long as the proper waivers were executed as was done here.
The appellant next complains of various costs which were imposed upon him. We find no error in imposing the court costs of $255 or the attorney’s fees of $300. However, the costs of investigation ($134) were imposed without proper request and documentation.1 Although the sentencing judge orally announced at the sentencing hearing that he was imposing these investigatory costs and neither the appellant nor his counsel objected, the sentencing judge had no authority to impose these costs without a request from the state. See § 939.01(1), Fla.Stat. (1991); Oates v. State, 659 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Accordingly we strike that portion of the written orders imposing the $134.
Finally, it was error for the sentencing judge to impose probation condition 16 and community control condition 20 which both require the appellant to pay for random drug testing since the judge did not orally pronounce these conditions at the hearing. Malone v. State, 652 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We strike these conditions also.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur. ALTENBERND, J., concurs specially.
. The sentencing judge imposed this $134 amount as restitution in the written probation and community control orders but the record is clear that this cost was imposed as cost of investigation pursuant to section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1991).
ALTENBERND, Judge,
concurring.
I agree that the investigation costs must be stricken because of our holding in Oates. I suspect that our record is simply missing the document from the Arcadia Police Department requesting its investigation costs of $134. Unlike the facts in Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the trial court specifically announced this award to the police department without objection from the defendant. It is certainly the better practice to follow the procedures in section 939.01(1), Florida Statutes (1991), but I doubt that it is fundamental error to omit these procedures where the defendant has actual notice and fails to challenge the imposition of costs of prosecution.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Bisson v. State, 696 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…ent. Imposition of investigative costs under these circumstances is illegal. Walker v. State, 692 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Pazo v. State, 684 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Meyers v. State, 676 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Golden v. State, 667 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). The state argues that section 924.051(3), Fla. Stat., which took effect July 1, 1996, bars this appeal because under the statute, an issue can only be appealed if it is either preserved by a timely objection, or is fundamental.…
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Pazo v. State, 684 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…urdo v. State, 667 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), quashed on other grounds, 682 So. 2d 557 (Fla.1996). We note that a contemporaneous objection was not required because the trial court lacked the authority to impose these costs. See Golden v. State, 667 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Gant v. State, 640 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s sentence, vacate the imposition of investigative costs, and remand for the reimposition of ■such costs, if appropriate, upon compliance w…
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Gonse v. State, 713 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…ng investigative costs, the trial court merely stated, “eighty dollars to the Sheriffs Office.” To impose this cost on remand, the State must request it and document the amount. See Imhoff v. State, 673 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Golden v. State, 667 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); § 939.01, Fla. Stat. (1995). With respect to the $2 discretionary cost authorized by section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1995), the trial court must orally impose it at the sentencing hearing. See Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 11…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Guinn v. State, 652 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Scott v. State, 618 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Oates v. State, 659 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)