CARL DANIEL JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that if the aggregate of jail time and probation supervision exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense, resentencing is required.
Carl Jones challenged his sentence, claiming the aggregate of jail time and probation supervision exceeded the statutory maximum. He had violated prob…
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PER CURIAM.
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), Carl Jones challenges the sentence imposed upon him. After a period of probation, which was continued in effect notwithstanding several violations, the court ultimately sentenced Jones to five years imprisonment with 327 days credit for time served. Jones claims the aggregate of jail time and probation supervision exceeds 327 days.
The combination of time spent incarcerated and under supervision may not exceed the statutory maximum provided for any offense. Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332 (Fla.1995). Jones spent twenty months and nineteen days in jail or under supervision prior to sentencing. Thus, his prison sentence coupled with the time he claims he spent in jail and on probation exceed five years even when the 327 days credit for time served is included in the computation. If his calculations are correct, Jones is serving an illegal sentence.
We reverse and remand in order that the trial court may append record documents, if any, to any order refuting Jones’ allegation. If the record fails to disclose that the sentence imposed, along with jail and probation time already served, lies within the maximum penalty allowed for the offense, resentencing is required. Jones’ presence at a new sentencing proceeding is unnecessary.
Timely review of any order of the trial court must be initiated by Jones within thirty days of the rendition of such order. Reversed and remanded.
FRANK, A.C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.
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Russell v. State, 676 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…reviewed the trial court order on the merits, and affirmed it. That determination is now the law of the case. See Love v. State, 559 So. 2d 198, 200-01 (Fla.1990).2-3 Affirmed. . Defendant asks that we certify direct conflict with Jones v. State, 667 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). In Jones the court directed that the defendant receive credit against his prison sentence for time previously served on probation. Id. We are, however, uncertain of the rule being followed in the Second District. More recently,…
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Bruggeman v. State, 681 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…here a split sentence is imposed upon revocation of a period of straight probation. However, this legal anomaly is a matter for the legislature. See Summers, 625 So. 2d 876. In his motion, Bruggeman relies on this court’s opinion in Jones v. State, 667 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), which we now acknowledge incorrectly applied the rule set forth in Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332 (Fla.1995). In Waters the supreme court held that, if the trial court includes probation as part of a sentence imposed upon revoca…
Authorities Cited
- Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1995)