SYLVIA W. THIBAULT, N/K/A SYLVIA MARIE WEBB, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
JOHN F. THIBAULT, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
On remand from a prior appeal, the First District Court of Appeal partially affirmed and partially reversed a supplemental final judgment in a divorce case, correcting the trial court's valuation of marital assets including a deferred compensation plan, a closely held corporation, and vehicles.
The court held that the deferred compensation plan should be valued at $24,950 as of the 1989 petition date with the former husband receiving a credit of one-half that amount; the former husband is entitled to a credit only for amounts the former wife withdrew from File Minders ($81,100) but not for corporate taxes paid in 1990-1991; and the vehicles do not offset because the former wife's vehicle was worth $10,000 free of liens while the former husband's was worth $10,500 subject to a $7,725.81 lien.
[1] A deferred compensation plan is a marital asset if all contributions to it were made from marital funds.
[2] The date for valuing marital assets and liabilities is generally the earliest of the date of separation agreement, a date agreed upon by the parties, or the date the peti…
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the date for determining the value of the marital assets and liabilities is the earliest of the date the parties entered into a separation agreement, a date agreed on by the parties, or the date the petition was filed, unless the trial judge determines another date is just and equitable under the circumstances”
Establishes the statutory standard for determining the valuation date of marital assets
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSylvia Thibault and John Thibault were parties to a dissolution of marriage. The trial court on remand valued a deferred compensation plan using 1992 …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Subchapter S Corporation cases and more on FLexlaw
ERVIN, Judge.
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a supplemental final judgment entered on remand following this court’s decision in Thibault v. Thibault, 632 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). We affirm all points raised with the following three exceptions.
The trial court correctly found that the former wife’s deferred compensation plan was a marital asset, because all the contributions made to it were from marital funds. The court erroneously found, however, that no value had been assigned to the plan at the time the petition for dissolution was filed and further erred by assigning a 1992 value and awarding the former husband a credit for the entire 1992 value.
Section 61.075(4), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that the date for determining the value of the marital assets and liabilities is the earliest of the date the parties entered into a separation agreement, a date agreed on by the parties, or the date the petition was filed, unless the trial judge determines another date is just and equitable under the circumstances. The petition for dissolution was filed in August 1989, and the wife’s public disclosure form for 1989 clearly indicates that her deferred compensation plan was worth $24,950.
Thus, the record fails to support the judge’s finding that no value had been assigned to the plan in 1989.
Moreover, as the former wife was required to withdraw certain sums from the plan during 1991 and 1992 for living expenses, because the former husband refused to pay court-ordered support, it would be unjust and inequitable to assign a 1992 value to the asset.
Finally, the trial court sought to divide the assets equally between the parties; therefore, its award of a credit representing the entire value of the deferred compensation plan to the former husband is inconsistent with an equal division of the assets.
The trial court is therefore directed on remand to value the former wife’s deferred compensation plan at $24,950 and to award the former husband a credit of one-half of that amount.
The second ruling requiring reversal involves the trial court’s award of a $97,691 credit to the former husband in connection with a closely held Subchapter S corporation known as File Minders.
The trial court correctly determined that the corporation was a marital asset, in that both parties contributed money and effort to the corporation. The $97,691 credit represents corporate taxes the former husband paid for 1990 ($13,945) and 1991 ($2,646), and amounts the former wife withdrew ($81,100) after the 1992 ruling which transferred the corporation solely to the former wife.
We agree that the former husband is entitled to a credit for the amounts withdrawn by the former wife, in that the corporation was ultimately determined to be a marital asset and the parties agreed to value the corporation in accordance with the proceeds received irom its sale following remand. We do not agree, however, that the former husband is permitted a credit for corporate taxes he paid in 1990 and 1991, because he was a stockholder at that time and entitled to the corporation’s income. See Sohacki v. Sohacki 657 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Zipperer v. Zipperer, 567 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), review denied, 581 So. 2d 1312 (Fla.1991).
The trial court is therefore directed on remand to award the former husband a credit of only $81,100 in the dis tribution of the proceeds from the sale of File Minders.
The third point requiring reversal is the trial court’s ruling in regard to the parties’ vehicles. The court found that each party owned a vehicle worth $10,000 at the time the petition was filed and that the vehicles offset each other. The record discloses, however, that the former wife owned a vehicle valued at $10,000 at the time the petition was filed, which was free from encumbrances, but that the former husband owned a vehicle worth $10,500, which was subject to a lien in the amount of $7,725.81. Thus, the record does not support a finding of equal value, thereby justifying an offset. The trial court is accordingly directed on remand to award the former husband a credit for the balance outstanding on his vehicle.
We have considered all remaining points raised by the parties and have found no other source of reversible error. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED for further proceedings.
WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…equitable distribution purposes, a deferred compensation account is considered marital property to the extent it consists of contributions from funds earned during the marriage. Boyett v. Boyett, 708 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla.1997); Thibault v. Thibault, 668 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Stock options and restricted shares may be given as deferred compensation for past services, but they may also be given as compensation for present or future services. See Seither v. Seither, 779 So. 2d 331, 333 (Fla. 2d DC…
-
Hedendal v. Hedendal, 695 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…h party with half of $63,-580. As the valuation of the husband’s business should have already included this $25,-000, it should not have been assessed twice by not deducting it before the fund was divided in half. See generally Thibault v. Thibault, 668 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). To this extent, the distribution of the Schwab Account must be recalculated to delete both the $24,000 set aside in the educational fund and the $25,000 spent for redecorating prior to assessing each spouse with half of the rema…
-
Doctor Rooter Supply & Serv. v. McVay, 226 So. 3d 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…v. Anson, 772 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). In fact, the corporation is á separate, legally recognized entity that holds title to its assets. Id Although a corporation that is owned by both spouses is a marital asset, see Thibault v. Thibault, 668 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), the corporation’s earnings are hot marital assets. Instead, assets that are “acquired through corpo [*1073] rate earnings are corporate assets until payments are made for services or as dividends.” Anson, 772 So. 2d at 54.…
Authorities Cited
- Zipperer v. Zipperer, 567 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Sohacki v. Sohacki, 657 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Thibault v. Thibault, 632 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)