CARY G. BYRON, APPELLANT,
v.
MARINE CARRIERS (USA), INC., RICHARD SMITH, JACKSONVILLE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC., AND JOHN HICKMAN, APPELLEES
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Byron sued Richard Smith, president of Marine Carriers Inc., for defamatory statements made by telephone from New Jersey to Florida. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the corporate shield doctrine, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the corporate shield doctrine does not apply when a corporate officer commits an intentional tort.
The trial court has personal jurisdiction over Smith individually. The corporate shield doctrine, which generally immunizes corporate employees acting in their corporate capacity from suit, does not apply when the corporate officer commits an intentional tort.
[1] The corporate shield doctrine does not apply when a corporate officer commits an intentional tort.
[2] Allegations of intentional torts in a complaint are assumed true when ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the corporate shield doctrine has no application when the corporate officer commits an intentional tort”
Establishes the central holding that the corporate shield doctrine exception applies to intentional torts
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceByron was hired by Marine Carriers Inc. (a New Jersey corporation) to oversee ship repairs. After his employment ended, Smith, MCI's president, teleph…
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VAN NORTWICK, Judge.
Cary G. Byron appeals an order dismissing, for lack of personal jurisdiction as to appellee Richard Smith, Byron’s amended complaint seeking damages for Smith’s allegedly defamatory statements. Because, as alleged in Byron’s amended complaint, Smith’s defamatory statements would constitute intentional torts, we conclude that the trial court has jurisdiction over Smith individually and reverse.
Byron was hired by Marine Carriers, Inc. (MCI), a New Jersey corporation, to oversee repairs on a U.S. Navy ship. After the repairs were completed and Byron was no longer employed by MCI, Smith, the president of MCI, spoke by telephone from his New Jersey office to a Jacksonville, Florida resident. According to Byron's amended complaint, Smith made defamatory statements indicating that Byron’s work was poor and that Byron received “kickbacks” from suppliers. Byron further alleges that these statements have caused him injury and seeks damages from MCI, Smith, and other defendants, jointly and severally, for slander, conspiracy to slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
MCI and Smith made special appearances, and each sought to dismiss the case. After receiving argument on the matter, the lower court dismissed the amended complaint as to Smith. MCI’s motion was denied. Byron now challenges the dismissal of Smith.
In its order, the lower court found that Smith was acting in his corporate capacity when he made the alleged defamatory telephone call. The lower court concluded that because “Smith’s alleged statements were made within his corporate capacity as President of MCI, this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Smith individually in Florida.”
We must disagree with the lower court’s conclusion. It is true that as a general rule the so-called “corporate shield” doctrine immunizes from suit a corporate employee acting in his corporate capacity. Doe v. Thompson, 620 So. 2d 1004 (Fla.1993). However, the corporate shield doctrine has no application when the corporate officer commits an intentional tort. Id. at 1006, n. 1, and Allerton v. State, 635 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also, Silver v. Levinson, 648 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In the instant case, the causes of action alleged in the amended complaint, which must be assumed true when ruling on a motion to dismiss, are all based upon the alleged intentional torts of Smith.
There was no finding below that the assertion of jurisdiction over Smith under the Florida long-arm statute would contravene traditional notions of fair play and justice. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla.1989). Therefore, we do not pass on that question. Further, by our decision in this cause, we make no determination as to the sufficiency of the causes of action alleged. We hold only that the corporate shield doctrine does not protect Smith from the jurisdiction of the circuit court given the allegations of the amended complaint. See, Aaron v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ZEHMER, C.J., and KAHN J., concur.
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Nicolina Galloway Koch v. Kimball, 710 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…suant to her employment with Progressive, that doctrine does not protect appellant here because the complaint alleged that she committed an intentional tort, which excludes her from protection under that doctrine. See Byron v. Marine Carriers, Inc., 668 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Allerton v. State Dep’t of Ins., 635 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). To paraphrase Allerton, these acts were not “untargeted negligence,” but were intentional tortious acts aimed at appel-lee in Florida. 635 So. 2d at 39. Appella…
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Rensin v. State, 18 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…um state,” this court explained that the corporate shield doctrine was unavailing when invoked against “intentional torts ... aimed at ... a Florida insurance company.” Allerton, 635 So. 2d at 39. Similarly, in Byron v. Marine Carriers (USA), Inc., 668 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), we held that the out-of-state president of an out-of-state corporation was subject to personal jurisdiction for defamatory statements made by telephone about the plaintiff to a Florida resident. The corporate shield doctrine did…
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Douglas Schnetzler, M.D. v. Cross, 688 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…sident corporate defendant could not rely on corporate shield doctrine where alleged that defendant committed intentional tortious acts expressly aimed at this state), rev. denied, 639 So. 2d 975 (Fla.1994); and Byron v. Marine Carriers (USA), Inc., 668 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(same). In the case before us, Dr. Schnetzler’s alleged negligent actions were not alleged to have been committed outside his duties as either a physician/employee of RPL or as RPL’s medical director.1 Thus, the corporate shield d…
Authorities Cited
- Venetian Salami Co. v. J.S. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989)
- DOE v. Jere William Thompson, 620 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1993)
- Silver v. Levinson, 648 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Allerton v. State of Fla. Dep't OF Ins., 635 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Aaron v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)