SAMUEL HABERSHAM, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

Fla. | 1920-07-10
Browne, G. J., and Taylor, Ellis and West, J. J., concur.
80 Fla. 240 Florida Supreme Court (1920) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Samuel Habersham was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit felony while armed with a dangerous weapon under Florida statute §3281. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the information sufficiently alleged the statutory offense and that adequate evidence supported the conviction.


Holding

The information sufficiently alleged the statutory offense as it substantially alleged all elements defined by the statute, and the use of common law terminology such as 'unlawfully,' 'feloniously,' or 'burglariously' was unnecessary when the allegations clearly stated the nature and cause of the accusation. The allegation that the defendant was 'armed with a dangerous weapon, to-wit, an automatic revolver' was sufficient, and ample evidence sustained the conviction.


Key Quotes

“as the information substantially alleges the offense defined by the statute, the use of other words was unnecessary when the allegations clearly state the nature and cause of the accusation and could not reasonably mislead or embarrass the accused in concerting his defense”

Establishes that statutory information need not use common law terminology if it substantially alleges the statutory offense with sufficient clarity

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Facts & Procedural History

Habersham was charged with breaking and entering the dwelling house of John Frohock located at 329 Eighth Street in Miami, Dade County, Florida on Dec…

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Opinion of the Court
Whitfield. J.

Whitfield. J.

The information herein alleges “that Samuel Habersham, laborer, late of the County of Dade and State of Florida, on the 20th day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and nineteen, in the county and State aforesaid, did then and there break and enter’a certain dwelling' house, to-wit, the dwelling house of one John Frohock, situated in Miami, Dade County, Florida, and known and designated as 329 Eighth Street, a more particular description of which said dwelling house being to the County Solicitor unknown, with intent then and there to commit a felony, to-wit, with intent then and there to take, steal, and carry away money, goods, and chattels therein' being of the value of more than Twenty Dollars ($20.00), of the money, goods, and chattels of the said John Frohock, a more particular description of which said money, goods and chattels being to the County Solicitor unknown, the said Samuel Habersham being then and there armed with a dangerous weapon, to-wit, an automatic revolver,, a more particular description of which said revolver being to the County Solicitor unknown, contrary to the form of the Statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.”

The statute defining the offense is as follows: “Whoever breaks and enters a dwelling house, or any building or structure within the curtilage of a dwelling house though not forming a part thereof, with intent to commit a felony, or after having entered with such intent breaks such dwelling house or other building or structure aforesaid, if he be armed with a dangerous weapon, or have with him any nitro-glycerine, dynamite, gunpowder or other high explosive at the time of breaking and entering, or if he arm himself with a dangerous weapon, or take into his possession any such high explosive within such building, or if he make an assault upon any person lawfully therein, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for life, or for such term of years as may be determined by the court.

“If the offender be not armed, nor arm himself with a dangerous weapon as aforesaid, nor have with him nor take into his possession any high explosive as aforesaid, nor make an assault upon any person lawfully in said building, he shall be-punished by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding twenty years.” §3281 'Gen. Stats. 1906. On writ of error taken to a judgment under this statute, it argued that' the information should have been quashed on the motion made, because the breaking and entering is not alleged to have been done “either unlawfully, feloniously or burglariously.”

Whatever may be the rule for alleging the common law crime of burglary, the prosecution here is under the statute and as the information substantially alleges the offense defined by the statute, the use of other words was unnecessary when the allegations clearly state the nature and cause of the accusation and could not reasonably mislead or embarrass the accused in concerting his defense. The allegation that the defendant was “armed with a dangerous weapon, to-wit, an automatic revolver,” is sufficient, as the dangerous character of the weapon may be shown under the allegation.

There is ample evidence to sustain the conviction of the statutory offense charged and no material or harmful errors of law or procedure appear. Affirmed.

Browne, G. J., and Taylor, Ellis and West, J. J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Mosby Finch and Ralph Stokes v. State, 116 Fla. 437 (Fla. 1934)
    …nt, whereby ■ employing the language of the statute, coupled with descriptive, details, the nature and the cause of the accusation as stated' [*441] could not reasonably mislead or embarrass the accused in concerting his defense. Habershal v. State; 80 Fla. 240, 85 Sou. Rep. 655; Montadoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 Sou. Rep. 157, 27 ALR 1291. The criticism of the indictment’in the present case is based on the contention that inasmuch as the statute does not define “ransom” or “kidnaping” that the facts and…
  • Williams v. The Honorable Nathan Mayo, 126 Fla. 871 (Fla. 1937)
    …all that the law requires. Tilley v. State, 21 Fla. 242; Schley v. State, 48 Fla. 53, 37 So. 518; Robinson v. State, 69 Fla. 521, 68 So. 549; Copeland v. State, 78 Fla. 483, 83 So. 290; Harrell v. State, 79 Fla. 220, 83 So. 922; Habersham v. State, 80 Fla. 240, 85 So. 655. Nor is the case of Croft v. State, 109 Fla. 188, 146 So. 649, in point here. There the accused was charged in the disjunctive with taking from the person or custody, whereas, here the information charges in the conjunctive that the pet…
  • Shumake v. State, 90 Fla. 133 (Fla. 1925)
    …the same offense. Sec. 11, Bill of Rights; Secs. 6063-6064, Rev. Gen. Stats.; Thomas v. State, 74 Fla. 200, 76 South. Rep. 780; Harrell v. State, 79 Fla. 220, 83 South. Rep. 922; Sasser v. State, 79 Fla. 490, 84 South. Rep. 380; Habersham v. State, 80 Fla. 240, 85 South. Rep. 655; Steffanos v. State, 80 Fla. 309, 86 South. Rep. 204. The judgment will be affirmed. Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell, Strum and Brown, J. J., concur.…

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