IGLESIA CASA DE ALABANZA, APPELLANT,
v.
BUS SERVICE, INC., APPELLEE
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The Third District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment for Bus Service in a breach of contract action, holding that the trial court erred by failing to take judicial notice of the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act and by excluding testimony from a representative of Iglesia Casa de Alabanza, a church defendant.
The court held that the trial court erred on both grounds. First, judicial notice of the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act should have been taken because the act was applicable to the contract dispute. Second, excluding testimony from a corporate representative of the church was error because excluding witness testimony is a harsh remedy to be invoked sparingly, and the defendant had listed in its witness catalog that it would call any and all parties to the lawsuit.
[1] A trial court must take judicial notice of applicable statutes when their applicability is demonstrated by the parties' pleadings.
[2] A corporate entity, such as a church, may testify through its representative.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Excluding the testimony of a witness is a harsh remedy which should be invoked sparingly.”
Establishes the legal standard that witness exclusion should rarely be used, supporting reversal of the trial court's exclusion of Alabanza's representative.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBus Service sued Iglesia Casa de Alabanza (Alabanza), a church, for breach of contract, alleging non-payment for bus repairs. Alabanza answered and co…
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PER CURIAM.
Iglesia Casa de Alabanza (hereinafter “Al-abanza”), the defendant below, appeals a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Bus Service Incorporated (hereinafter “Bus Service”) in a breach of contract action. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act, Sections 559.901-559.9221, Florida Statutes (1995).
Additionally, Alabanza argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of its representative at trial.
We agree and reverse the final judgment of the trial court based upon both grounds raised by the appellant. First, the trial court erred by failing to take judicial notice of the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act (hereinafter “the Act”). Bus Service’s complaint alleged that the appellant had breached its contract with Bus Service by not paying for the repairs performed on Alabama's bus by the appellee. In Alabama's responsive pleadings, which contained an answer and counter-claim, the appellant contended that Bus Service breached its contract with appellant and, furthermore, was negligent in performing the repairs to Alabama’s bus.
Accordingly, the parties’ pleadings demonstrate that the Act is applicable and, therefore, the trial court was in error when it denied Alabama’s request to take judicial notice of the Act. Barnett Bank v. Jacksonville Nat'l Bank, 457 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
The trial court also erred in prohibiting a representative of the appellant, which is a church and, accordingly, should be treated as a corporate entity, from testifying on behalf of Alabama. Nicholson Supply Co. v.
First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n of Hardee County, 184 So. 2d 438, 442 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). Although the appellant failed to list the name of any witness in particular that it intended to call at trial in the pre-trial witness catalog, Alabama did indicate in its witness list that it would be calling “[a]ny and all parties to this lawsuit.” Accordingly, the trial court was in error in not allowing the appellant to call a representative of the appellant.
First Republic Corp. of America v. Hayes, 431 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 441 So. 2d 632 (Fla.1983); Aguila-Rojas v. City Management Group Corp., 606 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“Excluding the testimony of a witness is a harsh remedy which should be invoked sparingly.”).
Although this issue has been resolved by the preceding paragraph, we must address a corollary issue raised by the appellee that relates to whether or not a representative of the church would have been qualified to testify regarding the alleged defects in Bus Service’s repairs. Bus Service argues that only an expert witness may offer this type of testimony and, since no expert witness was listed by Alabama in its witness list, the appellant should be precluded from offering any testimony concerning alleged defects in appellee’s work.
We reject this contention. Clearly, the owner of a motor vehicle, such as the appellant, can testify through its representative regarding the condition of the vehicle. This type of information can be imparted by anyone who has tried to drive the vehicle, and does not require an expert witness to convey this information. See § 90.701(1), (2), Fla.Stat. (1995).
Reversed.
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Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Estrella Perez, 180 So. 3d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…’s witness or to take that person’s deposition before trial. In short, there was no “showing of surprise in fact as to the existence of a witness or as to how the witness would testify.” Lugo, 487 So. 2d at 324; Casa de Alabama v. Bus Service, Inc., 669 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (finding the trial court erred in prohibiting a corporate representative from testifying where, although the corporate entity “failed to list the name of any witness in particular that it intended to call at trial in the pre-…
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Healthsouth Sports Med. & Rehab. Ctr. OF Boca Raton, Inc. v. Roark, 723 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…d, being in a patient’s file. As authority for their argument that Gas-sey, even though not specifically named, should have been able to testify as a representative of Healthsouth, defendants rely primarily on Casa de Alabanza v. Bus Service, Inc., 669 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). [*317] That case involved a dispute between a church and a mechanic who had not properly repaired the church’s bus. The third district reversed the trial court for refusing to allow the church to call its representative as a…
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Authorities Cited
- Nicholson Supply Co., Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Hardee Cnty., 184 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- First Republic Corp. OF Am. v. Hayes, 431 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Jones v. Jones, 606 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Barnett Bank OF Jacksonville, N.A. v. Jacksonville Nat'l Bank, 457 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)