SHARON WOODRUFF, APPELLANT,
v.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY AND USAA PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE, APPELLEE
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Sharon Woodruff appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim for uninsured motorist coverage under a USAA insurance policy issued to another person. The court affirmed, holding that Woodruff failed to present evidence of material facts to defeat the summary judgment and did not properly plead or support an estoppel claim.
Summary judgment was properly granted because Woodruff failed to present any evidence of material facts to dispute USAA's demonstration of nonexistence of such facts. Additionally, Woodruff did not plead an estoppel claim, did not seek leave to amend, and presented no evidentiary support for such a claim.
[1] A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must present evidence, not merely legal argument, to demonstrate the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.
[2] Where a movant for summary judgment offers sufficient evidence to support its claim of the nonexistence of material fact, the opposing party must demonstrate the existenc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the party opposing a motion for summary judgment must present evidence, not simply legal argument, demonstrating the existence of a disputed issue of material fact”
Establishes the burden on the non-movant to provide evidentiary support, not mere legal argument, to defeat summary judgment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUSAA issued an insurance policy to Donald Hal La Dez. Sharon Woodruff sought to recover uninsured motorist coverage, claiming she was an insured or fa…
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PER CURIAM.
Sharon Woodruff appeals a final summary judgment in favor of appellee, USAA Property and Casualty Insurance Company, determining that she was not an insured under the terms of a policy of insurance issued by USAA to Donald Hal La Dez. Woodruff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment since genuine issues of fact remain. Because Woodruff failed to present any evidence showing the existence of issues of material fact, we must affirm.
Woodruffs amended complaint sought to recover damages from USAA and Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO), alleging that she was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage as an insured under the terms of policies issued by USAA and GEI-CO. In its answer, USAA denied that Wood-ruff was an insured under its policy. USAA moved for summary judgment, contending that under the terms of its policy, Woodruff did not fall within the definition of either an “insured” or “family member” of an insured. As support for its motion, USAA filed and relied upon the affidavit of its underwriting district manager, the terms of its policy, and Woodruffs deposition testimony.
Woodruff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to USAA’s motion, arguing that factual issues remained in the case concerning whether USAA should be equitably es-topped from denying coverage. She filed no affidavit or other evidentiary matter, however, that would support her argument or create issues of fact with respect to USAA’s contentions. In addition, the record does not reflect that Woodruff sought leave to amend her complaint to add a claim in equitable or promissory estoppel.
While it is true, as argued by Woodruff, that questions of waiver and estoppel typically involve fact issues inappropriate for summary judgment, Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Eakins, 337 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Six L’s Packing Co., Inc. v. Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 268 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), the party opposing a motion for summary judgment must present evidence, not simply legal argument, demonstrating the existence of a disputed issue of material fact. Where a mov-ant for summary judgment (here, USAA) offers sufficient evidence to support its claim of the nonexistence of material fact, the opposing party (here, Woodruff) must demonstrate the existence of disputed issues of fact either by presenting evidence of countervailing facts or justifiable inferences from the facts presented. If the opposing party fails to present such evidence, summary judgment may be entered in favor of the moving party. See, Fleming v. Peoples First Financial S & L Assoc., 667 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); DeMesme v. Stephenson, 498 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Here, while Woodruff argues that facts support her cause of action for promissory estoppel, her amended complaint makes no mention of a cause of action based on promissory estoppel, she did not seek leave of the trial court to file an amended complaint stating such a cause of action, and no evidence is in the record that might establish facts that would support such a cause of action. In short, she provided no basis on which the trial court might have ruled in her favor. AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, BENTON and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
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THE Florida BAR v. Mogil, 763 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2000)…lusions, etc.) that Mogil attached to his letter to the referee likewise do not amount to the competent counter-evidence required here; rather, they amount merely to more assertions and legal arguments. See Woodruff v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 669 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(“[T]he party opposing a motion for summary judgment must present evidence, not simply legal argument, demonstrating the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.”). Even generously assuming otherwise (i.e., assuming…
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Scheibe v. Bank OF Am., N.A., 822 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…be properly entered in some cases where waiver and estoppel are raised as affirmative defenses, generally “questions of waiver and estoppel typically involve fact issues inappropriate for summary judgment_” Woodruff v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 669 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Eakins, 337 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Six L’s Packing Co., Inc. v. Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 268 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)); Consortion Trading Int’l, Ltd. v. Lowrance,…
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Graham v. Lloyd's Underwriters AT London, 964 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…ived its coverage defense in this case is a question for the finder of fact which cannot be resolved in a summary judgment proceeding. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Eakins, 337 So. 2d 418, 419-20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Woodruff v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 669 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Based on the above, we conclude that there are unresolved issues of material fact in this case with regard to actual distance, ambiguity of the “distance” provision in the application, notice, and waiver; all of which sho…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- SIX L'S Packing Co., Inc. v. Fla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 268 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Darius DeMESME v. Sam E. Stephenson, Jr., M.D., 498 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Mut. OF Omaha Ins. Co. v. Eakins, 337 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Fleming v. Peoples First Fin. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 667 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)