DARREN DIXON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1996-02-14
No. 93-2035
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and NESBITT, JJ.
670 So. 2d 92 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases
Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

Other
PER CURIAM.

On Motion for Rehearing

PER CURIAM.

The appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted. We vacate the sentence imposed and remand for resentencing. In 1991 appellant pleaded nolo contendere to strong arm robbery, a second degree felony. § 812.13(1), (2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1989); See Gilyard v. State, 636 So. 2d 134, 135 & n. 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), approved, 653 So. 2d 1024 (Fla.1995). Under section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), a second degree felony is subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of 15 years. Thus, appellant’s sentence of 17 years, while within the guidelines, im-permissibly “exceeds the maximum sentence provided by statute for that offense.” Rosa-Sanchez v. State, 561 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

Remanded for resentencing.

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  • Zimmerman v. Cade Enters., Inc., 34 So. 3d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
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  • Errol Rainess v. In re Est. OF Keiko MacHida, 81 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
    …merely as a stakeholder, and it must appear that no act on his part has caused the embarrassment of conflicting claims. Id. at 836. Florida courts continue to recite the four common law requirements for interpleader. See, e.g., Prince v. Underhill, 670 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); St. Mary’s Traditional Roman Catholic Church, Inc. v. Eight Hundred, Inc., 779 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). However, the only absolute requirement remaining under rule 1.240 is that the stakeholder “is or may be expos…
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