JOSEPH CARL WIGGINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1996-03-20
No. 95-2708
WEBSTER, MICKLE and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
670 So. 2d 160 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1996) Caution
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Wiggins appealed an order denying jail time credit for time spent incarcerated during a probation revocation proceeding. The Florida appellate court reversed the trial court's denial and directed that Wiggins receive credit for 499 days of jail time—36 days prior to initial disposition and 463 days from when the Department of Corrections received the probation violation warrant until the revocation proceeding concluded.


Holding

Wiggins is entitled to credit for 36 days spent in jail prior to initial disposition and 463 days attributable to the period between the Department of Corrections' receipt of the probation violation warrant and the conclusion of the revocation proceeding, for a total of 499 days of jail credit.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant is entitled to jail credit for the period between the custodian's receipt of an arrest warrant for probation violation and the conclusion of the probation rev…

[2] A defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in jail prior to the initial disposition of charges that resulted in probation.

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Key Quotes

“appellant is entitled to credit for 36 days spent in jail in 1986, prior to the initial disposition of the charges which resulted in his being placed on probation, and to an additional 463 days attributable to the period between receipt by the Department of Corrections of the arrest warrant for violation of probation and conclusion of the probation revocation proceeding”

Establishes the specific jail time periods for which Wiggins is entitled to credit

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant Wiggins spent 36 days in jail in 1986 before the initial disposition of charges that resulted in his placement on probation. Subsequently, w…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of an order denying his request, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), for credit for time spent in jail pending the conclusion of a probation revocation proceeding. This is the second time that the case has been before us. The first time, we reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion, and remanded with directions that the trial court attach to its order those portions of the record which support its decision. Wiggins v. State, 654 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). On remand, the trial court again denied the motion. We again reverse. _

From our review of the record, we conclude that appellant is entitled to credit for 36 days spent in jail in 1986, prior to the initial disposition of the charges which resulted in his being placed on probation, and to an additional 463 days attributable to the period between receipt by the Department of Corrections of the arrest warrant for violation of probation and conclusion of the probation revocation proceeding. (When the arrest warrant was issued, appellant was serving a sentence for an unrelated offense, in the Jackson Correctional Institution.) See Pearson v. State, 538 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (when determining entitlement to jail credit on concurrent sentence, defendant already in custody on unrelated charges must receive jail credit from date custodian receives warrant). Therefore, appellant is entitled to credit for a total of 499 days. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is directed to enter an amended order of revocation of probation and an amended judgment, giving appellant credit for 499 days.

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

WEBSTER, MICKLE and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Mosansky v. State, 33 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
    …nd the defendant guilty if he did not prove his claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt). And the instructions, taken as a whole, clearly, comprehensively, and correctly instructed the jury on the state’s burden of proof. See Roger v. State, 670 So. 2d 160,162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (holding that the jury was sufficiently apprised of the state’s burden of proof regarding self-defense where they were instructed that they must find the defendant not guilty if they had a reasonable doubt on the question of…
  • Clemente v. State, 695 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …probationary sentence, which resulted in a sentence of 3% years in prison. Appellant is entitled to credit for jail time served prior to the initial disposition of the charges which resulted in his being placed on probation. See Wiggins v. State, 670 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Tomiuk v. State, 663 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The trial court summarily denied appellant’s motion, stating that appellant had been given the correct amount of credit for time served. However, without record attachments,…
  • Vanderblomen v. State, 709 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
    …enials of credit had resulted in sentences beyond the “maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense.” See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 679 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Gonzalez v. State, 678 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Wiggins v. State, 670 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Worthington v. State, 667 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Slone v. State, 659 So. 2d [*148] 1208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Fulton v. State, 659 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Gradually, the impact of Davis and Calla-way on 3.800(a)…

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