CARL MALACHI DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carl Davis appealed the trial court's denial of his motions to sever drug charges from codefendants and to disqualify the judge. The appellate court affirmed both denials but remanded for resentencing correction where consecutive sentences were improperly imposed on some counts.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance because the offenses were episodic and occurred during an ongoing investigation in a limited time and area. The disqualification motion was properly denied because the judge satisfied statutory requirements and did not admit to bias. The sentences on Counts I and II were remanded for correction to reflect concurrent (not consecutive) sentences.
[1] Offenses occurring in the same geographic area during the same limited period of time and connected in an episodic sense may be tried together.
[2] Separate trials are required for similar offenses unrelated in terms of time or sequence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Separate trials are required for similar offenses which are unrelated in terms of time or sequence. However, where the crimes occurred during the course of an ongoing investigation, within a limited period of time and in a limited geographical area, and are clearly connected in an episodic sense, they may be tried together.”
Establishes the legal standard for when joinder of charges is permissible under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavis was charged with multiple drug offenses occurring in the same geographic area during the same limited period of time as part of an ongoing inves…
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RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
Carl Davis attacks the trial court’s denial of motions to sever his various drug charges from those of his codefendants and to disqualify the judge. We affirm the denial of the severance because the charged offenses were episodic. We also affirm the denial of the disqualification because the trial court’s order satisfied all of the statutory requirements pertaining thereto.
However, the state correctly notes that the appellant’s sentences on Counts I and II were to run consecutively to the life sentences imposed in Counts VI and VII, and, therefore, the sentences are remanded for correction.
Here, the offenses occurred in the same geographic area during the same limited period of time and were part of an ongoing investigation.
Separate trials are required for similar offenses which are unrelated in terms of time or sequence. However, where the crimes occurred during the course of an ongoing investigation, within a limited period of time and in a limited geographical area, and are clearly connected in an episodic sense, they may be tried together. Solomon v. State, 596 So. 2d 789, 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (citations omitted). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for severance.
Turning to the disqualification issue, the first assigned judge recused himself when the appellant’s attorney advised him that she had supported the successful contender to his judicial seat. When notified that Judge Langston would be assigned, she orally moved to disqualify him on grounds of racial prejudice. Judge Langston denied the motion and declared that he stood fair and impartial between the parties. The requirements of section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1993), were met. Whereas, a first recusal is freely granted, a second judge is not disqualified on account of alleged prejudice “unless such judge admits and holds that it is then a fact that he does not stand fair and impartial between the parties.” § 38.10, Fla.Stat. (1993). Because the facts of this case do not support a recusal, we affirm.
We remand for resentencing on Counts I and II to reflect the court’s oral pronouncement that ten years’ probation, concurrent on each of Counts I and II, would be served consecutively to the concurrent life sentences for Counts VI and VII. The appellant need not be present for resentencing.
Affirmed in part, and remanded for resentencing.
DANAHY and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.
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Hempstead v. State, 980 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…lt of the proceedings would have been different had the counts been severed. In denying Hempstead’s claim, the post-conviction court relied upon the State’s Reply to Motion for New Trial which cited two cases on the severance issue, Davis v. State, 670 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), and Solomon v. State, 596 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The State argued that the burglaries were “part of the same episodic crime spree occurring within the same area. The work of the St. Petersburg Police department was a sing…
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Smith v. State, 776 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…y properly be viewed as connected or related transactions under the rule. Hence, based upon our review of the evidence, we cannot conclude that a denial of the motion for severance constituted an abuse of discretion in this case. See Davis v. State, 670 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Solomon v. State, 596 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Wonyetye v. State, 648 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). For the foregoing reasons, we therefore affirm the conviction and sentence entered in this case. Affirmed. . Indeed, t…
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Vinas v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…initiated the sales, dealt with the same officers, and the transactions typically occurred either at the video tape store or at the defendant’s apartment, at routine intervals, and as a part of a common scheme or plan. Id.; see also Davis v. State, 670 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to sever defendant’s various drug charges from those of his co-defendants, as “the charged offenses were episodic” and “occurred in the same geographic…
Authorities Cited
- Federick Solomon v. State, 596 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)