BOBBY CHARLES CLARK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1996-03-15
No. Case No. 94-03369
RYDER, A.C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.
670 So. 2d 1061 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1996) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Bobby Charles Clark appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine found during a search of his residence. The court reverses the possession conviction because the evidence was insufficient to prove Clark had constructive possession of the cocaine, as the state failed to prove Clark knew of the drug's presence.


Holding

The conviction for possession of cocaine is reversed because the state failed to present sufficient evidence that Clark knew of the cocaine's presence. While dominion and control over the drawer could be inferred from Clark's residency, the evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the cocaine belonged to Clark's female roommate.


Headnotes

[1] Constructive possession of a controlled substance requires proof that the defendant knew of its presence, knew of its illicit nature, and had or shared dominion and contr…

[2] Evidence of prior drug sales from a residence, without more, is insufficient to prove knowledge of the presence of subsequently discovered drugs in that residence.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“In order to prove constructive possession, the state must show that Clark knew of the presence of the drug, knew of its illicit nature, and had or shared dominion and control over it.”

Establishes the three-part test required to prove constructive possession of drugs

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

On February 15, 1994, Clark sold $20 of cocaine to a law enforcement officer and informant at his kitchen door. During a search warrant execution on M…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Bobby Charles Clark appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine. We reverse because the evidence was insufficient to prove that Clark had constructive possession of the cocaine.

On February 15, 1994, a law enforcement officer and an informant went to the kitchen door of a residence and purchased $20 of cocaine from Clark. After the sale, Clark said, “You all come back,” but told them not to bring anyone else to his house. A search warrant was later issued for the house. During the search on March 1,1994, cocaine was found in a plastic vial in a kitchen drawer. Clark was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine and one count of sale of cocaine, based on the incidents on February 15th and March 1st. In this appeal he challenges only the conviction for possession of the cocaine found during the March 1st search. Clark argues that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal as to that charge.

Since Clark was not in actual possession of the cocaine at the time the house was searched, he could be convicted only if he was found to have constructive possession of the drug. In order to prove constructive possession, the state must show that Clark knew of the presence of the drug, knew of its illicit nature, and had or shared dominion and control over it. See Rogers v. State, 586 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). For the purposes of Clark’s motion for judgment of acquittal, the state’s evidence as to his residency in the house was sufficient to show that the defendant shared dominion and control with another resident over the drawer where the cocaine was found.

The remaining question is whether the state presented sufficient evidence to show that Clark knew of the presence of the cocaine. There is no direct evidence that he did. The defendant’s fingerprints were not found on the container of cocaine. The cocaine was found in a kitchen drawer which also contained a man’s watch and a lipstick. Thus, the contents did not point to the drawer being used exclusively by either Clark or his female roommate.

Clark’s actions and statements to the officer and the informant on February 15th indicate that he was in possession of cocaine in the house on that date and that he might be in possession of cocaine in the house in the future. While those statements are evidence that the cocaine later found in the house might have belonged to the defendant, neither those statements nor the other evidence rule out the possibility that the seized cocaine belonged to the other resident of the house. Nor does the evidence prove that the defendant knew of the existence of this particular cocaine on this date.

Because the evidence did not exclude all reasonable hypotheses of Clark’s innocence, the motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted. Accordingly, Clark’s conviction for one count of possession of cocaine is vacated.

RYDER, A.C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Loyd v. State, 677 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
    …esent during the search, corroborated this testimony. The trial court viewed this as a case of exclusive possession. We disagree. Loyd was not in actual possession of the contraband at the time the police searched the residence. See Clark v. State, 670 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). In fact, Loyd was not even at home when the deputies conducted the search. We, therefore, analyze this as a constructive possession case. In order for the state to show constructive possession, it must prove that the defendant: (…
  • Williams v. State, 154 So. 3d 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
    …ity to exercise dominion and control over them. We disagree. Appellant’s statement that he went into the house to “put up” his dope does not tend to prove actual or constructive possession of the cocaine found on the windowsill. See Clark v. State, 670 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (noting that although the defendant’s statement showed that he might be in possession of other cocaine, it was not sufficient to show he was in possession of the cocaine found during execution of the search warrant). The fac…
  • State v. Blackwell, 787 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
    …. See id. Some cases'Suggest that where a defendant is charged with constructive possession, evidence that the defendant may have possessed a similar substance on a previous date is not probative on the possession charge. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 670 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). These cases are not controlling, however, because they are, literally, cases seeking to introduce evidence of other bad acts. It may well be that when prosecuting a defendant charged with constructive possession, the State may no…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw