ANDRE QUARTERMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1996-04-03
No. 95-179
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and GODERICH and FLETCHER, JJ.
670 So. 2d 1169 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Andre Quarterman was sentenced to seventeen years as a habitual felony offender after pleading guilty to burglary under duress of a furlough condition. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the record lacked required findings of fact regarding prior convictions and proper evidence of qualifying predicate offenses at sentencing.


Holding

The sentencing was reversible error. The failure to make requisite findings of fact is harmless only where evidence of qualifying prior convictions is easily discernible from the record, allowing meaningful appellate review. Here, the record was devoid of such evidence, making the error reversible rather than harmless.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must make specific findings of fact when sentencing a habitual offender.

[2] The failure to make findings of fact for habitual offender sentencing is harmless error if evidence of prior convictions is discernible from the record.

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Key Quotes

“The legislature intended that the trial court make specific findings of fact when sentencing a habitual offender.”

Establishes the statutory requirement for findings of fact in habitual offender sentencing

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Facts & Procedural History

Quarterman was charged with burglary and the State filed notice of intent to seek enhanced penalty sentencing as a habitual felony offender. After eig…

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Opinion of the Court
FLETCHER, Judge.

FLETCHER, Judge.

Defendant Andre Quarterman was charged by the State with burglary in violation of section 810.02(3), Florida Statutes (1993). Pursuant to section 775.084(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), the State filed notice of its intent to seek enhanced penalty sentencing under the habitual felony offender statute. § 775.084(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993).

On October 25,1993, after being in custody pending trial for eight months, Quarterman came before the trial court and sought a furlough to visit his one-year-old daughter who was to have surgery the following day. The court agreed to the furlough on the condition that Quarterman plead “to seventeen as a habitual offender.” The court further stated that if Quarterman returned at a time certain, the court would vacate the plea. As events transpired, Quarterman did not return on a timely basis and, without further hearing, judgment and sentence were entered against him for a term of seventeen years as a habitual felony offender. On appeal, Quarterman contends that the record is devoid of any oral or written findings regarding prior convictions, and that the State did not provide the sentencing court with a presentence investigation report or certified copies of predicate convictions; therefore, the habitual felony offender sentencing was reversible error. We agree.

The legislature intended that the trial court make specific findings of fact when sentencing a habitual offender. See § 775.084(3)(d), Fla.Stat. (1993). The Florida Supreme Court has held, however, that the failure to make such findings of fact is harmless error where evidence of timely pri-or convictions, which have not been pardoned or set aside, is easily discernible from the record, thus allowing meaningful appellate review. Herrington v. State, 643 So. 2d 1078 (Fla.1994). In this case, the record is devoid of the requisite evidence.

Although the State belatedly attempted to supplement the record on appeal with certified copies of prior convictions, this Court denied the motion to supplement because the proper place for introduction of such evidence is before the trial court prior to or at the time of sentencing, not on appeal of a sentence already entered. In absence of record evidence showing the propriety of habitual offender sentencing in this case, we cannot say that the trial court’s failure to make written or oral findings of fact supporting the sentence was harmless.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand the cause for resentencing, and direct the trial court to conduct a hearing in accordance with section 775.084(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1993). At the hearing, evidence of prior qualifying convictions may be admitted, if such exists, and Quarterman, through counsel, may exercise full rights of confrontation.

Reversed and remanded for resentencing.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Scarboro v. State, 832 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
    …im of error in habitual offender sentencing, because this issue [*932] ■will likely arise again if the defendant is convicted. The requirement for introduction of the certified copies of the predicate convictions is set forth in Quarterman v. State, 670 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). For the stated reasons, the convictions are reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.* * This moots the second and third points on appeal.…
  • Harris v. State, 737 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
    …itual felony offender sentencing. Because the basis for such sentencing is not easily discernible from this record, the absence of findings of fact is not harmless error. See Herrington v. State, 643 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1994), and Quarterman v. State, 670 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing at which the trial court will again have discretion, if it be so advised, to sentence defendant as a habitual felony offender upon proper proof of the required co…

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