OTTO JONES, III, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Otto Jones appeals the trial court's summary denial of his Rule 3.850 motion for relief from conviction, claiming he entered an involuntary guilty plea based on his attorney's misrepresentation that he would serve only two years of a ten-year sentence. The court affirms most issues but reverses and remands on the involuntary plea claim, holding that an attorney's promise of a shorter prison term than legally permissible states a prima facie case for relief.
An allegation that defense counsel promised a client would serve fewer years than permitted by law states a prima facie case for 3.850 relief. The written plea agreement's general language about no promises of leniency does not conclusively refute the claim, because early release eligibility is not equivalent to a promise of a light sentence or leniency.
[1] An allegation that defense counsel represented to a client that the client would serve a lesser term of years than permitted by law states a prima facie case for relief u…
[2] A written plea agreement's statement that no promises of a light sentence, probation, or leniency were made does not conclusively refute a claim of involuntary plea based…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An allegation that defense counsel represented to his or her client that the latter would serve a lesser term of years than is permitted by law states a prima facie case for 3.850 relief.”
Establishes the legal standard that promises by counsel about sentence length constitute grounds for post-conviction relief
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones pleaded guilty to charges and received a ten-year sentence. After sentencing, he learned he was ineligible for early release due to the nature o…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Otto Jones, III, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.1 We affirm all issues raised except appellant’s second issue, in which he contends that he entered an involuntary plea, based upon his attorney’s advice that he would serve no more than two years of a negotiated ten-year sentence. We reverse and remand on this issue.
Following the imposition of his sentence, Jones learned that he was not entitled to early release because of the nature of his crime. An allegation that defense counsel represented to his or her client that the latter would serve a lesser term of years than is permitted by law states a prima facie case for 3.850 relief. See, e.g., Eady v. State, 622 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Leroux v. State, 656 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 663 So. 2d 632 (Fla.1995). The trial court did not attach a transcript of the plea hearing; therefore, we cannot determine whether Jones testified that he had not been given any promises regarding the amount of time he would serve on his sentence. Contrary to the trial court’s holding, we cannot consider the following statement in the written plea agreement as conclusively refuting Jones’s claim:
4. No person, officer, agent or any official of any branch of government, nor my attorney, has made any promises or suggestions of any kind to me or anyone else to my knowledge, that if I would plead guilty to these charges that I would receive a light sentence, probation or other form of leniency, except as set forth below in the following plea bargain agreement.
(Emphasis added.) Early release by the Department of Corrections is not equivalent to a light sentence, probation, or leniency.
We reverse on this issue and remand to permit the trial court to attach portions of the record that refute this allegation or to hold an evidentiary hearing.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED for further proceedings.
ERVIN, MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. . Jones pled guilty on May 7, 1993, and filed his 3.850 petition May 30, 1995. This was timely, pursuant to Gust v. State, 535 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), and Caracciolo v. State, 564 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (on rehearing).
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Sampson v. State, 687 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…t the charge for violation of community control had been dismissed, when in fact he received a consecutive sentence for that violation, extending his sentence by three years. See Middleton v. State, 603 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Jones v. State, 671 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We therefore reverse and remand for attachment [*363] of portions of the record or for an evidentiary hearing. GLICKSTEIN, POLEN and KLEIN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Gust v. State, 535 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Caracciolo v. State, 564 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Eady v. State, 622 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Leroux v. State, 656 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)