BRUCE H. BELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed a conviction for drug trafficking but reversed and remanded the imposition of a cost, certifying a question about the retroactivity of a prior ruling on defendant's presence during jury selection.
The court held that the appellant's absence from sidebar during peremptory challenges was not reversible error because the ruling in Coney v. State applied prospectively only and not to 'pipeline cases.' The court also held that the $100 cost was improperly imposed without statutory authority or explanation.
[1] A defendant has the right to be physically present at the immediate site where peremptory challenges are exercised.
[2] The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Coney v. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In Coney, the Florida Supreme Court held that a defendant has the right to be physically present at the immediate site where peremptoxy challenges are exercised.”
Establishes the rule from the precedent case being discussed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant was convicted of trafficking in heroin. He argued that his absence from sidebar during peremptory challenges constituted reversible erro…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from Appellant’s conviction and sentence for trafficking in heroin or its derivative in violation of section 893.135(l)(c), Florida Statutes. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
Appellant argues that reversible error occurred under Coney v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 315, 133 L.Ed.2d 218 (1995), because he was absent from sidebar when counsel exercised their peremptory strikes. In Coney, the Florida Supreme Court held that a defendant has the right to be physically present at the immediate site where peremptoxy challenges are exercised. 653 So. 2d at 1012-1013. The Florida Supreme Court further held that its holding was to be applied prospectively only. In Lett v. State, 668 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (on rehearing), this court interpreted the term “prospective” as used in Coney to mean that Coney would not apply to “pipeline cases.” See also Quince v. State, 660 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Ogden v. State, 658 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 666 So. 2d 144 (Fla.1995).
Since Coney was decided during the pendency of this appeal, Coney does not apply, and we affirm Appellant’s conviction on this issue.
However, as in Lett, we certify the following question to the supreme court: DOES THE DECISION IN CONEY APPLY TO “PIPELINE CASES,” THAT IS, THOSE OF SIMILARLY SITUATED DEFENDANTS WHOSE CASES WERE PENDING ON DIRECT REVIEW OR NOT YET FINAL DURING THE TIME CONEY WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE OPINION?
In addition, we find no merit to Appellant’s arguments that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a full Richardson hearing and failing to grant Appellant’s motion for mistrial. Thus, we affirm without further comment. We must reverse and remand, however, the trial court’s imposition of a $100 cost to “FCLTF” because there is no notation to statutory authority or any explanation in the record indicating what the cost represents. Bradshaw v. State, 638 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
BOOTH, JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Garcia v. State, 679 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…1996). Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for resentencing. . Horn v. State, 677 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Gainer v. State, 671 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Berwick v. State, 671 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Bell v. State, 671 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Branch v. State, 671 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Howard v. State, 670 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Lee v. State, 670 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).…
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Bell v. State, 684 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1996)…ON IN CONEY APPLY TO “PIPELINE CASES,” THAT IS, THOSE OF SIMILARLY SITUATED DEFENDANTS WHOSE CASES WERE PENDING ON DIRECT REVIEW OR NOT YET FINAL DURING THE TIME CONEY WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE OPINION? Bell v. State, 671 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answered this question in Boyett v. State, No. 81,971, — So. 2d-[1996 WL 693616] (Fla. Dec. 5,1996). There we wrote: In Coney [v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009 (Fla.), cert…
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Whitfield v. State, 695 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…s amount. We also strike the imposition of a $100.00 cost attributable to “CLTF,” because neither the order imposing this cost nor the transcript of the sentencing hearing identifies to what it is attributable, or its statutory basis. Bell v. State, 671 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). To the extent that this sum represents an unidentified mandatory cost, on remand, the trial court may reimpose it, provided that it specifies the statute mandating imposition. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED,…
Authorities Cited
- Coney v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1995)
- Torey Bradshaw and Alford R. Martin v. State, 638 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Alfredco Lett v. State, 668 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Ogden v. State, 658 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Quince v. State, 660 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)