ELDRIDGE E. BRAVO, JR., AND GEORGE A. KNUTTSSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
MILDRED RODRIGUEZ, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Bravo and Knutsson appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss or transfer venue in an action by Rodriguez to enforce a judgment against them individually by piercing the corporate veil of their company. The court reversed and remanded, holding that the new cause of action for veil-piercing accrued where the defendants reside (Pinellas County), not where the underlying accident occurred (Dade County), and remanded for further proceedings allowing Rodriguez to amend her complaint and present additional evidence.
Venue is improper in Dade County. The court held that Rodriguez's current cause of action for veil-piercing is a new, separate cause distinct from the original accident claim, and venue for this new cause must be determined under section 47.011 based on where the defendants reside, where this new cause of action accrued, or where property is located—not based on the location of the prior accident.
[1] Venue for an action to pierce the corporate veil is determined by the venue rules applicable to the new cause of action, not the underlying cause of action that resulted…
[2] A cause of action for piercing the corporate veil accrues where the alleged fraudulent conduct of the corporate officers and directors occurred, not necessarily where the…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.”
States the controlling venue statute (section 47.011, Florida Statutes) that determines proper venue based on defendant residency, where the cause of action accrued, or property location.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRodriguez obtained a final judgment against Sundance Carriage Corp. (d/b/a Dollar Rent-A-Car of Florida) based on an automobile accident that occurred…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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FLETCHER, Judge.
This is an appeal of a non-final order denying appellants Eldridge E. Bravo, Jr. and George A. Knutsson’s motion to dismiss or transfer venue. We have jurisdiction under rule 9.130(a)(3)(A), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Appellee Mildred Rodriguez filed the instant action against Bravo and Knutsson, individually, to enforce a final judgment for monetary damages she obtained in a previous action against Sundance Carriage Corp., d/b/a Dollar Rent-A-Car of Florida (“Sun-dance”). The complaint involved in this appeal alleges that the judgment was based upon a lease of an automobile by Sundance to one of its customers who then had an automobile accident with Rodriguez. The rental and the accident occurred in Dade County, where the judgment was subsequently entered. In her effort to enforce the judgment against the individuals, Rodriguez alleges that it is uncollectible against Sundance. Essentially, she is attempting to pierce the corporate veil of Sundance so as to make Bravo and Knutsson, alleged to be the sole officers and directors of Sundance, liable individually.
The rub here, however, is that Bravo and Knutsson appear to be residents of Pinellas County, and, on this basis, they have moved for dismissal or transfer of venue. They rely on section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1995), which provides that “[ajctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.”
Rodriguez responds that the “underlying cause of action,” which she describes as being the automobile rental, the collision, and the entry of judgment against Sundance, took place in Dade County. As a consequence, she contends, the present cause against the Sundance officers and directors accrued in Dade County and her choice of venue is proper pursuant to section 47.011. We disagree.
Rodriguez’ prior cause, resulting from the accident in Dade County, terminated in the entry of judgment. The cause she now is pursuing is a new one, seeking compensation (in the form of payment of the Sundance judgment) essentially for allegedly fraudulent conduct on the part of Bravo and Knuts-son. The venue inquiry thus relates to this new cause, not the prior one. See Home Ins. Co. v. Thomas Indus., 896 F. 2d 1352 (11th Cir.1990); Proctor v. Commercial Bank of Okeechobee, 373 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
As in Cameron v. Smith New Court, Inc., 608 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), we are not prepared at this time to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to transfer venue. However, we reverse the order appealed and remand -without prejudice to Rodriguez’ amendment of the complaint to allege additional facts in support of venue in Dade County as to her new action and for an evidentiary hearing on the motion to transfer venue. Both sides should be permitted to conduct discovery and submit affidavits in support of their respective positions on the issue.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Home Ins. Co. v. Thomas Indus., Inc., 896 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1990)
- Cameron v. Smith NEW Court, Inc., 608 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Proctor v. Commercial Bank OF Okeechobee, 373 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)