DAVID R. DOAK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the appellant's murder conviction should not be scored as the primary offense on his scoresheet, and the robbery conviction should be resentenced within the guidelines, potentially allowing for a departure sentence.
[1] A capital offense conviction should not be scored as the primary offense on a defendant's scoresheet when sentencing for other offenses.
[2] Upon remand, a trial court may depart from sentencing guidelines if valid criteria exist, even if the initial departure was not explicitly announced.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavid R. Doak was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with a deadly weapon. He appealed his judgments and sentences, arguing issues with his …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Scoresheet Preparation cases and more on FLexlaw
WHATLEY, Judge.
The appellant, David R. Doak, challenges his judgments and sentences for first-degree murder and robbery with a deadly weapon. We conclude there is no error as to Doak’s convictions and affirm. We remand this cause for resentencing, however, on the robbery offense.
Doak contends that since first-degree murder is a capital offense and is not subject to the guidelines, his conviction therefor should not have been indicated as the primary offense on his seoresheet. He further argues that because that conviction was reflected as the primary offense on his score-sheet, the wrong seoresheet was prepared. We agree. Thus, pursuant to Stuart v. State, 536 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), a category three seoresheet, rather than a category one seoresheet, should be prepared on remand and should reflect the robbery with a deadly weapon conviction as Doak’s primary offense. Id. at 364. The first-degree murder conviction should, of course, remain unscored. Id.
Doak also contends that the trial court improperly departed from the guidelines by imposing a life sentence on his robbery conviction. He therefore argues that the instant case should be remanded for re-sentencing within the guidelines as to that offense. We disagree.
Where a trial court is unaware that it has imposed a departure sentence, it may consider departing from the guidelines upon remand “provided there exist valid criteria for doing so.” Brintley v. Singletary, 605 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). See also Henderson v. State, 577 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Here, Doak’s unscored capital felony conviction would have been a proper basis for a departure on the robbery conviction. See Freeze v. State, 553 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The record, however, gives no indication that the trial court intended to depart for any reason upon sentencing Doak for that offense. Therefore, on remand, the trial court may consider departing from the guidelines on Doak’s robbery conviction if there exist valid criteria for doing so. Brintley.
Finally, Doak argues, and the state correctly concedes, that pursuant to Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111, 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the trial court improperly failed to announce at sentencing that it was assessing $45 against Doak for the cost of prosecution. That cost is therefore stricken.
Accordingly, Doak’s sentence for robbery with a deadly weapon is reversed and the cause remanded for preparation of a new seoresheet and resentencing as to that offense. Doak’s convictions are otherwise affirmed, as is his sentence on his first-degree murder conviction.
Affirmed in part, stricken in part, and reversed and remanded in part.
PARKER, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Cabreriza v. State, 871 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…llegal sentence. As the State properly concedes, the trial court erred in scoring the first degree murder as an offense for conviction on the sentencing guideline scoresheet, since the guidelines apply only to noncapital felonies. See Doak v. State, 671 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Stuart v. State, 536 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The first degree murder charge should not have been reflected as the primary offense on the defendant’s scoresheet. Armed robbery and armed burglary should have been the only of…
Authorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Henderson v. State, 577 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Freeze v. State, 553 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Gray v. State, 536 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Freeman Brintley v. Singletary, 605 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)