R.H., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A juvenile was charged with possession of cocaine after police ordered him out of a lawfully stopped vehicle, during which he dropped the drug. The court reversed the delinquency adjudication, holding that the order to exit was an unconstitutional seizure because it was based solely on the juvenile's verbal complaints about harassment rather than safety concerns or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The court held that an order to exit a vehicle is a Fourth Amendment seizure that must be supported by either a valid safety concern or founded suspicion of criminal activity. Because the officer's order to R.H. was based solely on his hostile attitude and verbal abuse—which was protected First Amendment speech—and not on any safety motivation or reasonable suspicion, the seizure was unconstitutional and the cocaine must be suppressed.
[1] An order for a passenger to exit a lawfully stopped vehicle, absent a valid safety concern, constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure that must be supported by a founded sus…
[2] A passenger's verbal complaints or "hostile attitude" towards a police officer during a lawful traffic stop do not, in themselves, provide the founded suspicion necessary…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an order to exit a vehicle is a Fourth Amendment seizure, see Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185 (Fla.1993); Cooper v. State, 584 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), which must be supported — in the absence of a valid safety concern — by a founded suspicion of criminal activity which did not exist here.”
Establishes that exiting a vehicle is a seizure requiring constitutional justification beyond mere officer discretion.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMetro-Dade police officer Edward Orenstein stopped a vehicle for rolling through a stop sign after observing four Caucasian youths speaking with an Af…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse First Amendment Protection Of Speech cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
R.H. pled nolo to possession of cocaine, reserving the right to review of the denial of his motion to suppress the contraband. We reverse the consequent adjudication of delinquency because the motion should have been granted.
R.H. was the right-front seat passenger in a vehicle stopped by a Metro-Dade police officer, Edward Orenstein, ostensibly for “rolling through” a stop sign, after the officer saw the four Caucasian youths in the car speaking with an African-American man in an inner city area. The officer gave the driver a warning about the stop sign offense and a citation for violating a driver’s license glasses requirement. During this process, R.H. continued to mouth off at the officer, loudly complaining that he and his friends were being unjustifiably harassed. Apparently fed up with the abuse, Officer Oren-stein finally ordered R.H. out of the car. As he emerged in response to the command, he dropped a clear plastic bag of cocaine on the ground.
We conclude that the cocaine was unconstitutionally secured because the police order which resulted in its discovery was invalid.
We may assume arguendo (as we are inclined to believe).that the initial stop, following as it did the officer’s observation of a traffic violation, was not pretextual. See State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040 (Fla.1995); Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988).
It is also widely held that, just as he may the driver, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977); State v. Williams, 371 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1980), an officer may order a passenger from a lawfully stopped vehicle as a protective measure for his own safety, without any additional evidence of wrongdoing or danger. See Doctor v. State, 573 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 596 So. 2d 442 (Fla.1992).
See generally State v. Landry, 588 So. 2d 345, 347 (La.1991); People v. Martinez, 187 Mich.App. 160, 466 N.W. 2d 380, 383-84 (1991), appeal denied, 439 Mich. 935, 480 N.W. 2d 106 (1992); People v. Robinson, 74 N.Y.2d 773, 775, 543 N.E. 2d 733, 733-34, 545 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966, 110 S.Ct. 411, 107 L.Ed.2d 376 (1989); State v. Soares, 648 A. 2d 804, 806 (R.I.1994).
Even if these authorities, however, correctly reflect the law — which we need not directly hold — they do not apply in this case. This is simply because safety had nothing to do with the command in question. Unlike the officers involved in many of the cited cases, Orenstein did not even suggest that it did. More important, he did not initially make such an order and never disturbed the two rear-seat passengers at all. It is therefore obvious that the order was issued to R.H. alone only because of his “hostile attitude.” This is not constitutionally enough.
Although perhaps de minimis, see Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111, 98 S.Ct. at 333, an order to exit a vehicle is a Fourth Amendment seizure, see Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla.1993); Cooper v. State, 584 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), which must be supported — in the absence of a valid safety concern — by a founded suspicion of criminal activity which did not exist here. See also Evans v. State, 546 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (order to remove hands from pocket is seizure).
Thus, in the almost identical situation presented in Cooper, the court suppressed contraband dropped by a passenger who had been ordered out of a properly stopped vehicle because his erratic actions provided no reasonable basis either for the officer’s professed concerns for his safety or for a suspicion of unlawful conduct. This ease is even weaker both because Orenstein did not testify to any such motivation and because R.H.’s verbal abuse, however obnoxious, was not only not unlawful, but was affirmatively protected by the First Amendment. See B.R. v. State, 657 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); L.A.T. v. State, 650 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), and cases cited; see also Popple, 626 So. 2d at 185.
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…rticulable suspicion of criminal activity, and all she was doing when she approached Taylor's car was engaging in a consensual encounter with a citizen. Ordering Taylor out of his car changed that encounter into a Terry stop. See also R.H. v. State, 671 So. 2d 871, 871-2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)(Schwartz, J.)(officer may order a passenger out of a car that police have legally stopped). Here, the state doesn’t receive the benefit of Mimms because Malone’s initial stop of Taylor was unlawful. . First District: State…
-
Marice Billips v. State, 777 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…asonably believes that the officers are not engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty, cf. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla.1993)(order to exit vehicle is an illegal seizure absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); R.H. v. State, 671 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)(same), Billips went far beyond simply refusing to cooperate. She had to be forcibly removed from the car, and, in the process, she struck the officers with her fists and elbows. We believe that the evidence was sufficient to suppo…
-
State v. Holland, 680 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…2d 1366, 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (holding that running a stop sign is an offense “for which a law enforcement officer is authorized to make a warrantless arrest, when the offense is committed in the officer's presence.”). . See also R.H. v. State, 671 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); State v. Velez, 649 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); State v. Banfield, 614 So. 2d 551, 552-53 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 626 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1993); State v. Rodriguez, 542 So. 2d 454, 455-56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Pre-Kehoe cases li…
Authorities Cited (13 total)
- Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (U.S. 1977)
- Tedd J. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993)
- Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1988)
- Terrtric Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1992)
- State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1995)
- L.A.T. v. State, 650 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Evans v. State, 546 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Terrtric Doctor v. State, 573 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- State v. Williams, 371 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Cooper v. State, 584 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)