GREGORY O'NEAL MCKENZIE, APPELLANT,
v.
SANDRA RYALS MCKENZIE, APPELLEE
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In a marriage dissolution case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's final judgment and remanded for a new hearing, not on the merits of support and equitable distribution, but because the trial judge's 13-month delay in entering the final judgment (from January 1994 to February 1995) far exceeded the presumptively reasonable 180-day period and suggested the judge may not have recalled the evidence presented at trial.
The court held that the trial judge's delay in entering the final judgment far exceeded the presumptively reasonable 180-day period for contested domestic relations cases and necessitated a new trial to ensure the judge recalled and considered the evidence presented at trial.
[1] A trial court's unreasonable delay in entering a final judgment after a hearing may necessitate a new trial.
[2] A judge has a duty to rule upon a matter submitted to them within a reasonable time.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(f) provides that a judge has a duty to rule upon a matter submitted to him or her 'within a reasonable time.'”
Establishes the applicable judicial duty regarding timely rulings in pending cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former wife filed a petition for dissolution in July 1993. The final hearing was held on January 27, 1994. The trial judge did not enter the final…
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PER CURIAM.
In this marriage dissolution case, the appellant asserts numerous errors in the support and equitable distribution scheme adopted by the trial court in the final judgment of dissolution. Because we agree with appellant’s additional contention that the trial court’s delay in entering the final judgment necessitates a new trial, we do not reach the support and distribution issues. The former wife filed her petition for dissolution in July 1993, and the final hearing was held on January 27, 1994. The trial judge did not enter the final judgment until February 3, 1995, by which time a year had passed since the hearing. Inconsistencies in the final judgment suggest that the trial judge may not have recalled the evidence presented at the hearing.1
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(f) provides that a judge has a duty to rule upon a matter submitted to him or her “within a reasonable time.” A presumptively reasonable time period for the completion of a contested domestic relations case is 180 days from filing to final disposition. Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.085(d)(1)(C). The instant case involved a delay in excess of twice what is deemed presumptively reasonable, just in the period between the hearing and final judgment. This requires a new trial. See Falabella v. Wilkins, 656 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (delay of 14 months between hearing and judgment in a custody case required a new trial to insure that the trial judge recalled and considered the evidence presented at trial); Polizzi v. Polizzi, 600 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (delay of 3⅜ months between the hearing and judgment in dissolution case required a new hearing).
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the ease is remanded for a new final hearing as to all issues except the dissolution of the marital bonds and the custody of the minor children.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ERVIN, MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. . Although the final judgment concluded that an $8,000 down payment on the marital home was a gift from a relative that neither party had to repay, the judgment went on to adopt the former wife's equitable distribution scheme which lists the payment as the wife’s liability. Similarly, the former wife is "credited” for a payment made to her attorney, despite that portion of the final judgment making the parties responsible for their own attorney’s fees.
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Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Caswell v. Caswell, 674 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…on Dunn’s counterclaim was held on February 3, 1994. However, the final judgment was not entered until June 12, 1995. Courts have consistently held that an excessive delay in the entry of a final judgment requires reversal. In McKenzie v. McKenzie, 672 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), the court held that a twelve-month delay between the final hearing and the entry of the final judgment in a marriage dissolution case required a new trial. The McKenzie court noted that inconsistencies in the final judgment indi…
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Walker v. Walker, 719 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…cord. In McKinley, there were no conflicts or inconsistencies; hence reversal was not required. The First District found that inconsistencies in the final judgment, rendered a year after the final hearing, required reversal in McKenzie v. McKenzie, 672 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). A seven-month delay was held to be unreasonable in City of Miami v. Tarafa Construction, Inc., 696 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), and Tunnage. In both cases the courts noted confusing and contradictory provisions in the final j…
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Yitzhari v. Eli Yitzhari, 906 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…1275, 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(reversing and remanding for a new trial where a final judgment, entered nearly seven months after close of all the evidence, was found to be “somewhat confusing, and in some cases contradictory”); McKenzie v. McKenzie, 672 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(reversing a judgment entered a year after the final hearing and remanding for a new trial because “[i]n-consistencies in the final judgment suggest that the trial judge may not have recalled the evidence presented at the hear…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Polizzi v. Polizzi, 600 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Falabella v. Marcy Wilkins, 656 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)