CAROLENE WATSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carolene Watson appealed her cocaine sale conviction, challenging the arresting officer's testimony about the nature of the arrest location and certain sentencing conditions. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and most sentencing conditions but remanded for clarification of cost assessments.
The officer's comments did not unduly prejudice the jury as they constituted mere background information explaining the operational context rather than an impugn of the area's reputation. The sentencing conditions were valid because appellant had constructive notice through publication in the Rules of Court. The case was remanded solely to specify the amount of costs and public defender fees in the written order.
[1] Testimony regarding the nature of the area in which an arrest occurred does not per se warrant reversal, but reviewing courts must consider whether prejudice exists based…
[2] Comments about the area of an arrest may be admissible as background information to explain why a police operation was conducted in that location, rather than as an attem…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although comments that the defendant was arrested in a high-crime area are often prejudicial and constitute reversible error, Sherrod v. State, 582 So.2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), the supreme court has held that such comments do not per se warrant reversal.”
Establishes that location comments require case-by-case analysis rather than automatic reversal
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWatson was arrested during a sheriffs department 'buy-bust' operation in which undercover officers attempted to purchase narcotics in narcotics areas.…
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[*72] SHAHOOD, Judge.
Appellant, Carolene Watson, appeals her conviction, after a jury trial, for the sale of cocaine. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.
As her first issue on appeal, appellant contends that she was prejudiced by the arresting officer’s testimony which amounted to a comment about the nature of the area in which she was arrested. In explaining how appellant’s arrest occurred, the officer testified that the sheriffs department was doing “buy-bust” operations during which “undercover officers will go out and attempt to make purchases of narcotics in narcotics areas.” Although comments that the defendant was arrested in a high-crime area are often prejudicial and constitute reversible error, Sherrod v. State, 582 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), the supreme court has held that such comments do not per se warrant reversal. Gillion v. State, 573 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1991). Instead, reviewing courts must consider whether prejudice exists based on the facts of each ease. Id. at 812.
In Gillion, the court affirmed the conviction for sale of cocaine, reasoning that the testimony at issue was merely the officer’s account of what he observed and not a comment on the character of the location or an attempt to impugn the area’s reputation. Id. at 811. The court found that the officer’s observations merely aided the jury in placing the testimony in context by clarifying “why this area was selected for this police operation.” Id.; see also Conner v. State, 582 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (comment about area in which arrest occurred did not compromise integrity of trial since it amounted to background information explaining why officers had selected particular area for undercover drug transaction). Accordingly, we hold that in the instant case the officer’s comments did not unduly prejudice the jury since they amounted to mere background information and not an attempt to impugn the area’s reputation.
We affirm also the court’s imposition of costs as well as the condition prohibiting appellant from consuming alcohol or visiting places in which alcohol is sold. Although the trial court did not orally pronounce these conditions, appellant had constructive notice of same by virtue of their publication in the Rules of Court. See State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1996).
We remand only for the limited purpose of allowing the court to specify the amount assessed for court costs and public defender fees, as costs were awarded but not reflected in the written order. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
GLICKSTEIN and FARMER, JJ., concur.
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Odell Wheeler v. State, 690 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the fact that the entire defense was premised on defendant’s lack of intent. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986); Harris v. State, 655 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); cf. Watson v. State, 672 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 679 So. 2d 775 (Fla.1996) (admission of testimony concerning undercover officer’s attempt to purchase narcotics in narcotics areas was mere background information that did not unduly prejudice defendant). On remand, t…
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Goodwin v. State, 721 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…catch dealers.” The trial court sustained the objection and gave a curative instruction to disregard the comment, but reserved its ruling on the motion for mistrial until after the trial, at which time the motion was denied based on Watson v. State, 672 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 679 So. 2d 775 (Fla.1996). Our review of the record convinces us that this single comment was not “unduly prejudi [*729] cial,” see Gillion v. State, 573 So. 2d 810, 812 (Fla.1991), as the state had already elicited si…
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Lelieve v. State, 7 So. 3d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…he supreme court has held that such comments do not per se warrant reversal. Gillion v. State, 573 So. 2d 810 (Fla.1991). Instead, reviewing courts must consider whether prejudice exists based on the facts of each case. Id. at 812. Watson v. State, 672 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also Lubin, 754 So. 2d at 143 (concluding that the existence of undue prejudice stemming from testimony regarding a high crime area or other drug dealing activity “depends on the facts of each case”). As the Fifth Distr…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1996)
- Gillion v. State, 573 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1991)
- Seabron Sherrod v. State, 582 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Conner v. State, 582 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)