RAYMOND CHARTIER, PETITIONER,
v.
HAROLD J. SHERMAN, RESPONDENT
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PER CURIAM.
TMs case comes before tMs court on a petition for common law certiorari to review a decision of the circuit court acting in its appellate capacity. The underlying action involves a commercial lease. During the pendency of a suit for possession brought by Sherman, the landlord, he moved for payment of rent pursuant to § 83.232 Fla.Stat. (1993).
Under the statute, rent is to be paid into the court registry during the pendency of the litigation.
However, pursuant to a stipulation between the attorneys, the parties agreed that payments would be paid directly to the landlord. The tenant, Chartier, faded to abide by the terms of the stipulated agreement and, after notice, the trial court entered a default as permitted by § 83.232(5). Subsequently, the trial court entered a writ of possession in favor of the landlord.
The circuit court, in its appellate capacity, ultimately sustained the writ of possession.
We find there was no departure from the essential requirements of the law and therefore, the petition for certiorari is demed.
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214 Main St. Corp. v. Tanksley, 947 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…entitled to a writ of possession. See City of Miami v. Smith, 698 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (stating that county judge was required to issue an immediate writ of possession pursuant the mandatory terms of section 83.232(5)); Chartier v. Sherman, 672 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (denying certiorari relief to tenant and upholding default under section 83.232(5) where tenant failed to abide by terms of stipulated agreement that rent be paid directly to landlord during pendency of litigation); Courthouse Tow…
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Morrow v. Frommer, 913 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…ded. • The case was remanded so that the trial court could inquire into the availability of medical insurance and allocate responsibility for the child’s reasonable medical expenses between the two parties. See id. at 821; see also Zucker v. Zucker, 672 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that remand was required due to fact that final judgment of dissolution did not contain any provision addressing status of any medical insurance for parties’ child or general responsibility for child’s medical care). Lik…
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Lesley Anne Negron v. RAY, 769 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…onse from the father and an opportunity for each to produce such evidence as may be relevant. Finally, the mother claims that the court erred in not providing for uncovered future medical expenses. We agree that this is error. See Zucker v. Zucker, 672 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We, therefore, defer this matter for a post-judgment motion for clarification or modification so that an appropriate record may be available. AFFIRMED in part; reversed and remanded for allocation of responsibility for the chil…
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