CARLTON J. ROBINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Carlton Robinson appeals his convictions for interfering with a firefighter and resisting arrest without violence after he refused to move his vehicle from a no-parking zone, blocking emergency medical services responding to a medical emergency at a festival. The appellate court affirmed, holding that firefighters performing emergency medical services fall within the statutory definition of firefighters performing their duties.
The court held that a firefighter performing emergency medical services in response to a life-threatening situation is engaged in the performance of his duty under the statute. Robinson's refusal to move his vehicle, which obstructed emergency responders' access to the victim, constituted unlawful interference with firefighters. The court also rejected Robinson's argument that his yelling constituted constitutionally protected speech that prevented legal arrest.
[1] A person commits the offense of interfering with a firefighter when they willfully or unreasonably interfere with, hinder, or assault any firefighter in the performance o…
[2] Interfering with a firefighter's duty includes actions that hinder a firefighter providing medical services, not solely those extinguishing fires.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“"firefighter" means any person initially employed as a full-time professional firefighter by any employing agency, as defined herein, whose primary responsibility is the prevention and extin-guishment of fires, THE PROTECTION AND SAVING OF LIFE AND PROPERTY, and the enforcement of municipal, county, and state fire prevention codes”
Statutory definition of firefighter that includes protecting and saving life, supporting the holding that emergency medical response falls within firefighter duties
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn October 1993, fire inspector Gary Sexsmith was at the Hollywood Jazz Festival when notified of a seizure victim. He directed an EMS unit to the wes…
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POLEN, Judge.
Carlton Robinson appeals his convictions for interfering with a firefighter and resisting arrest without violence. We affirm.
In October of 1993, Gary Sexsmith, a fire inspector, was on duty at the Hollywood Jazz Festival, when he was notified that a festival worker was having a seizure. He called for an Emergency Medical Unit and directed that the unit meet him at the west gate entrance. Upon arriving at the west gate, Sexsmith found Robinson’s vehicle parked in a no parking zone which blocked the EMS unit’s access through the west gate. Sex-smith testified that he asked Robinson three times to move his vehicle because an EMS unit was in route. When Robinson refused, Sexsmith went in search of a police officer. Sexsmith returned with officer Branford of the Hollywood Police Department. Officer Branford testified that when he arrived, Robinson’s ear was blocking the entrance and that Robinson refused to move his car when asked. It was not until the EMS vehicle was behind Robinson that he attempted to move his car. The officer testified that even then, Robinson moved his car slowly and only a few feet. Additionally, when Branford attempted to arrest Robinson, he resisted by flailing his arms in an attempt to prevent being handcuffed. Eventually he was detained and brought to jail. Robinson was found guilty of resisting arrest without violence and interfering with a firefighter. The court placed him on one year’s probation.
On appeal, Robinson argues the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of interfering with a firefighter, because the firemen involved were not engaged in their duties as firefighters. He argues that in attempting to save a human life, the firefighters were acting outside the scope of their duties.
Robinson was convicted under section 806.10, Florida Statutes (1993), which reads in pertinent part:
Preventing or obstructing extinguishment of fire
(2) Any person who willfully or unreasonably interferes with, hinders, or assaults, or attempts to interfere with or hinder, any firefighter in the performance of his duty shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
The delineation of a fireman’s duties are found in section 633.30 which states in pertinent part:
Standards of firefighting; definitions
(1) “firefighter” means any person initially employed as a full-time professional firefighter by any employing agency, as defined herein, whose primary responsibility is the prevention and extin-guishment of fires, THE PROTECTION AND SAVING OF LIFE AND PROPERTY, and the enforcement of municipal, county, and state fire prevention codes....
(Emphasis added.)
Reading section 633.30 in para materia with section 806.10, it is clear that an individual violates section 806.10 by interfering with a firefighter who, in the course of his or her employment, is attempting to save a human life. At bar, the firemen were responding to a seizure victim, a situation involving the preservation of human life. Mr. Sexsmith was clearly hindered and interfered with by Robinson’s actions as he was forced to leave the scene of the emergency to obtain the assistance of Officer Branford. Moreover, the firemen in the EMS truck were also hindered and interfered with by Robinson, as their path to the victim was obstructed by Robinson’s vehicle. Contrary to Mr. Robinson’s assertions, subsection (2) of the statute makes no distinction between a firefighter who is extinguishing a fire and one who is providing medical services.
As to appellant’s conviction for resisting arrest without violence, since no motion for judgment of acquittal was made, no error can be raised in that regard. We reject appellant’s argument that there could be no legal arrest, because appellant’s action in yelling was constitutionally protected speech.
AFFIRMED.
STONE and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Stachel v. City of Cape Canaveral, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (M.D. Fla. 1999)…ities. The plaintiff argues that there was no probable cause for her arrest under § 806.10 because that section only applies to firefighters who are extinguishing a fire or attempting to save someone’s life. In Robinson v. State of Flonda, 673 So.2d 114, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), the court found that the defendant violated § 806.10 by refusing to move his vehicle when told by a firefighter that it was blocking the path of an emergency medical vehicle. See id. The court in Robinson read §…