STEVEN LAMAR MILHOUSE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Steven Lamar Milhouse pleaded no contest to consumption of alcohol on a public street and cocaine possession, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The court affirmed the suppression ruling but struck certain improperly imposed sentencing costs.
The court affirmed that the officer had probable cause to arrest Milhouse for consuming alcohol on a public street and that the search incident to arrest was lawful. However, the court struck three categories of costs: the $100 Hillsborough County Court Improvement Fund assessment (not authorized by statute), the $2 criminal justice education cost, the $100 costs of prosecution, and the $250 public defender's fee (all imposed as an unannounced lump sum rather than individually announced).
[1] Probable cause exists to arrest a person for consuming alcohol on a public street when the officer observes the person drinking from a bottle while crossing a public stre…
[2] A search incident to a lawful arrest is permissible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The officer had probable cause to arrest the appellant for violating the ordinance against consumption of alcohol on a public street; the appellant was drinking from a long-neck Budweiser bottle while crossing a public street.”
Establishes the factual basis for probable cause and upholds the lawfulness of the arrest
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMilhouse was observed by an officer drinking from a long-neck Budweiser bottle while crossing a public street in violation of a local ordinance. When …
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PER CURIAM.
Steven Lamar Milhouse entered a no contest plea to consumption of alcohol on a public street1 and possession of cocaine,2 reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He was sentenced to six months’ probation concurrent with one year’s probation for possession. He now appeals the judgment and sentence. We affirm the ruling on the motion to suppress, but strike certain costs imposed at sentencing.
The officer had probable cause to arrest the appellant for violating the ordinance against consumption of alcohol on a public street; the appellant was-drinking from a long-neck Budweiser bottle while crossing a public street. See State v. Joyce, 529 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). When the officer searched him incident to the arrest, he found a vial of cocaine in one of the appellant’s pockets. We therefore affirm the order denying the appellant’s motion to suppress.
Although we affirm the judgment, we must strike certain costs imposed at sentencing. A $100 assessment for the Hillsbor-ough County Court Improvement Fund is stricken because it is not authorized by statute. Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc). Discretionary costs imposed as a lump sum are stricken because they were not individually announced at sentencing. Id. These include $2.00 for criminal justice education authorized by section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994); $100 for costs of prosecution authorized by section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1993); and $250 for a public defender’s fee authorized by section 27.56, Florida Statutes (1993).
The state may seek to have the authorized costs imposed again. However, before costs of prosecution may be reimposed, the state must prove their amount and the trial court must consider the appellant’s financial resources. Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Contrary to the appellant’s argument, in reimposing the public defender’s lien, the trial court need not ascertain that the appellant has the ability to pay. The supreme court has already held that such a determination is only necessary when the state seeks to enforce collection of the fee. State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 189 (Fla.1991).
Affirmed; improper court costs stricken; remanded.
THREADGILL, C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur. . Tampa, Fla., Code § 4-4 (1992).
. § 893.13(6)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993).
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Freddrick Lee Cook v. State, 896 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…ially at issue. There is no constitutional bar to advising an indigent defendant that he may be required to repay the costs of appointed counsel and to collecting those costs at some later time if the defendant becomes solvent.”); Milhouse v. State, 673 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). We recognize that language in two recent cases could be misconstrued as requiring a trial court to consider ability to pay in assessing the public defender fee or any other cost considered to be discretionary. In Edwards v. Stat…
Authorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- State v. Joyce, 529 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)