FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ON BEHALF OF ELISA BARRANCO, APPELLANT,
v.
LOUIS BARRANCO, JR., APPELLEE
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The Florida Department of Revenue appealed a trial court's modification of child support, challenging the court's refusal to impose a lump sum payment, larger monthly payments toward arrearage, and interest on the arrearage. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's discretionary decisions regarding payment amounts and denial of prejudgment interest, but reversed the denial of attorney's fees.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the lump sum and larger monthly payments. Prejudgment interest was properly denied because the father had been making timely payments since the last arrearage judgment and there was no default. However, the trial court erred in denying attorney's fees by focusing on their reasonableness rather than the father's ability to pay, which is the only relevant consideration under Title IV-D.
[1] Prejudgment interest on child support arrearage accrues only where there has been a default in payments.
[2] The reasonableness of attorney's fees is not a relevant consideration when determining the right to an award of attorney's fees under Title IV-D.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Prejudgment interest accrues from the date of the last support payment to the date of the arrearage judgment only where there has been a default.”
Establishes the rule limiting prejudgment interest to situations involving default, justifying denial of interest in this case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLouis Barranco, Jr. was obligated to pay child support for two children who are now emancipated. The father had been making timely support payments si…
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PER CURIAM.
The Florida Department of Revenue,1 on behalf of Elisa Barraneo, appeals a final order for modification of child support for two children, now emancipated. The Department challenges the trial court’s refusal to require the father, Louis Barraneo, Jr., to make a lump sum payment and larger monthly payments toward the child support arrearage. We find no abuse of discretion in these rulings. The Department also contends the trial court erred in denying interest on the arrearage and attorney’s fees. We find error only in the failure to award attorney’s fees. We otherwise affirm the order. The wife was not entitled to prejudgment interest on the $8,207 judgment for arrearage. Prejudgment interest accrues from the date of the last support payment to the date of the arrearage judgment only where there has been a default. See Ledford v. Leirer, 486 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Melvin v. Melvin, 391 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The father had been making timely support payments since the last judgment for arrearage in 1991, which was $14,-065.
The trial court improperly denied attorney’s fees by evaluating the reasonableness of the fees in determining the right to an award. §§ 409.2567 and 409.2554(11), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994). Ability to pay the fees is the only relevant consideration for an award of attorney’s fees under Title IV-D. See Department of Revenue v. Atherley, 659 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (administrative costs are to be assessed against a nonprevail-ing obligor upon a determination of the non-prevailing obligor’s ability to pay).
By considering the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees in denying an award, the trial court did not reach the issue of the father’s ability to pay them. The court should grant the fees upon remand if the father’s financial condition — apparent from the face of the record — has not changed since the modification proceedings. The standardized attorney’s fee of $427.08 that the Department asked for was the equivalent of only one month’s payment on the arrearage. § 409.25(11), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994) (amount of attorney’s fees determined by method approved by Federal Government).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
THREADGILL, C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur. . The state agency responsible for administration of the child support enforcement program under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651 et seq. (1991). § 409.2557, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994).
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Melvin v. Melvin, 391 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Ledford v. Leirer, 486 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- State v. Cordell J. Atherley, 659 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)