HARRY K. SINGLETARY, JR., SECRETARY OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLANT,
v.
BYRON CORONADO AND BISHOP FASHAW, APPELLEES
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The trial court erred in ordering the award of gain-time to inmates transferred to county jail, as this authority rests exclusively with the Department of Corrections.
Two inmates, Coronado and Fashaw, were transferred to county jail to testify. The trial court ordered they be awarded full gain-time as if they remain…
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PER CURIAM.
Byron Coronado and Bishop Fashaw are inmates serving sentences in the custody of the Department of Corrections. After sentencing and commitment, Coronado and Fashaw were transported from the Department of Corrections’ custody to the Sarasota County Jail, apparently at the state’s behest. The purpose of the release was to permit them to provide testimony in the trial of State v. Reaves, then pending in the Circuit Court of Sarasota County.
On July 15,1994, the Reaves court entered two orders requiring that Coronado and Fashaw be awarded full gain-time as if they had remained in Department of Corrections’ custody performing work assignments. The orders were entered without notice to the Department of Corrections.
The trial court was in error. The authority to regulate gain-time resides exclusively within the Department of Corrections pursuant to chapter 944, Florida Statutes (1993), and it is only the department that has “the ability to award, forfeit, or restore gain-time.” State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925, 927 (Fla.1989).
Based upon the foregoing, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FRANK, A.C.J., and FULMER and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
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Moore v. Pearson, 789 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2001)…89); Walker v. State, 619 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Where a sentencing court attempts to either bar or grant gain time awards, those portions of the sentencing order have been struck or treated as “surplusage.” See Singletary v. Coronado, 673 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that trial court lacked authority to award gain time to prisoners who testified at state’s behest); Shupe v. State, 516 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (striking portion of sentence ordering that no gain time be allowed unt…
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Miller v. State, 882 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…e gain time resides with the Department of Corrections. Moore v. Pearson, 789 So. 2d 316 (Fla.2001). If, in sentencing, a court attempts to bar or grant gain time, such language has been treated as surplusage or stricken. See Singletary v. Coronado, 673 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Shape v. State, 516 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). However, a court has the authority and jurisdiction to effect a fair sentence by awarding credit for time served, to insure that a defendant is accorded due process where, due t…
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James v. Crosby, Jr., 861 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…89); Walker v. State, 619 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Where a sentencing court attempts to either bar or grant gain time awards, those portions of the sentencing order have been struck or treated as “surplusage.” See Singletary v. Coronado, 673 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)(holding that trial court lacked authority to award gain time to prisoners who testified at state’s behest); Shupe v. State, 516 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)(striking portion of sentence ordering that no gain time be allowed until…
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- State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1989)