LEO P. STEINMETZ AND NANCY P. STEINMETZ, APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES,
v.
G.D. PARKER SOD, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Steinmetzes appealed a jury verdict awarding damages to the Johnsons for misrepresentation regarding undisclosed liabilities in a sod company sale. The appellate court reversed, finding the Johnsons' claim barred by the four-year statute of limitations and that the trial court erred in denying costs against the corporate defendant.
The Johnsons' misrepresentation claim was barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed more than four years after the cause of action accrued when the Johnsons discovered the misrepresentation. The trial court erred in denying costs to the Steinmetzes; G.D. Parker Sod, Inc. was liable for costs on the claim brought in its own name regardless of the Johnsons' success on other counts.
[1] A cause of action for misrepresentation accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs, and the statute of limitations runs from the time the facts…
[2] A suit for misrepresentation filed more than four years after the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the misrepresentation is barred by the statute of limitations.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A cause of action for misrepresentation is governed by a four year statute of limitations. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1995).”
Establishes the applicable statute of limitations period for misrepresentation claims.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn May 1988, the Steinmetzes and Johnsons executed a contract for the Johnsons to purchase 32% of G.D. Parker Sod, Inc., with a warranty that the comp…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prevailing Party Costs cases and more on FLexlaw
GOSHORN, Judge.
Leo and Nancy Steinmetz appeal the final judgment entered on the jury verdict in favor of James and Vickie Johnson. The Johnsons’ suit against the Steinmetzes stemmed from an alleged misrepresentation by the Stein-metzes that the sod company .(G.D. Parker Sod, Inc.) the Steinmetzes were selling to the Johnsons had no debts or liabilities.
The jury found in the Johnsons’ favor on the misrepresentation count and awarded the Johnsons $11,500.
On appeal, the Stein-metzes argue, inter alia, that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations and that the court erred in denying their motion to tax costs against G.D. Parker Sod, Inc., where G.D. Parker Sod, Inc. lost on the sole claim asserted in its name. Because we find in their favor on these two issues, we need not address the remaining arguments raised by the Steinmetzes.
On May 12, 1988, the Steinmetzes and the Johnsons executed a contract whereby the Johnsons agreed to immediately purchase 32% of the shares of G.D. Parker Sod, Inc. from the Steinmetzes, with an option to purchase the remaining 68% one year from the closing date of June 1, 1988. Paragraph (e) of the contract contained the Steinmetzes’ warranty that G.D. Parker Sod, Inc. had no liabilities or obligations of any nature, absolute or contingent, other than those shown in an exhibit. No exhibit was attached to the contract, nor was one provided at any time. The Johnsons testified that the Steinmetzes verbally assured them that there were no liabilities. In June, 1988, the Johnsons learned to the contrary that there were undisclosed liabilities. Unfortunately, the Johnsons failed to file their complaint until November 24,1992.
A cause of action for misrepresentation is governed by a four year statute of limitations. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1995). The cause of action accrues “when the last element constituting the cause of action oc^ curs.” § 95.031(1), Fla.Stat. (1995). The period runs “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” § 95.031(2), Fla.Stat. (1995). The Johnsons’ suit, filed as it was some four years and five months after the Johnsons acquired knowledge of the misrepresentation, was barred by the statute of limitations. As to the Steinmetzes’ costs claim, the jury found against G.D. Parker Sod, Inc. on the only count asserted in its name.
Nevertheless, the court denied the Steinmetzes’ costs claim relative to the defense of that count. The court found, “The Johnsons, individually and as the owners and principals of the corporation, are, in reality, the prevailing parties in this multi-count suit arising out of a single set of circumstances ...” On appeal, the Steinmetzes argue that pursuant to section 57.041,1 they were entitled to recover those costs.
We agree that G.D. Parker Sod, Inc. was liable for costs relative to the claim brought in its name, regardless of whether the Johnsons prevailed on any count.
There was no basis for the court to treat G.D. Parker Sod, Inc. as the Johnsons’ alter ego. G.D. Parker Sod, Inc. brought suit in its own name alleging a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against the Stein-metzes in their capacity as directors. Having lost, G.D. Parker Sod, Inc. is liable for costs. See Folta v. Bolton, 493 So. 2d 440 (Fla.1986) (holding that if each count of a multicount complaint is separate and distinct and would support an independent action, as opposed to being alternative theories of liability for the same wrong, the prevailing party on each distinct claim is entitled to an award of his attorney’s fees).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment, including costs, in favor of the Steinmetzes.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GRIFFIN and ANTOON, JJ., concur. . Section 57.041 provides in pertinent part, "The party recovering judgment shall recover all his or her legal costs and charges which shall be included in the judgment....”