AL CRESPO, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA ENTERTAINMENT DIRECT SUPPORT ORGANIZATION, INC.; BOB ALLEN; SETH GORDON; PEGGI MCKINLEY; CHRIS QUALMANN; FRANK LOCONTO; RANDALL W. LORD; MONA ROWAND-MAY; NORM RICE; EUGENE RODRIGUEZ; RAY RODRIGUEZ; AND JO SUSAN SIMMS, APPELLEES
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The court held that summary judgment was not premature despite outstanding discovery, and that the summary judgment on the merits was correct.
Crespo sued Florida Entertainment Direct Support Organization and its board members for Sunshine law violations. The trial court entered summary judgm…
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PER CURIAM.
A1 Crespo appeals a summary final judgment. We affirm.
Crespo sued the Florida Entertainment Direct Support Organization, Inc., and past and present members of its board of directors1 alleging violations of the Sunshine laws. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Crespo has appealed.
As a preliminary matter, Crespo argues that summary judgment was premature, because certain interrogatories and requests for admission had been objected to by defendants. We disagree with Crespo on this point.
Defendants had responded to all discovery which was conceivably material to the Sunshine law issues in this case. The objected-to items were reviewed in detail by defendants at the summary judgment hearing, and were clearly immaterial. When afforded an opportunity to explain the materiality of the objected-to items, plaintiff declined to argue the point.
A trial court has the discretion to deny a continuance of a summary judgment hearing where the outstanding discovery items are immaterial to the dispositive issues in the case. See Amjad Munim M.D., P.A., v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145, 151 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Colby v. Ellis, 562 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
Turning to the merits, we conclude that the summary judgment is correct. See Tolar v. School Board of Liberty County, 398 So. 2d 427 (Fla.1981); Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla.1972); Monroe County v. Pigeon Key Historical Park Inc., 647 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
Affirmed.
. The individual defendants are Bob Allen, Seth Gordon, Peggi McKinley, Chris Qualmann, Frank Loconto, Randall W. Lord, Mona Ro-wand-May, Norm Rice, Eugene Rodriguez, Ray Rodriguez, and Jo Susan Simms.
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In re the Est. OF Carlos Rumaldo Herrera v. Berlo Indus. Inc., 840 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…s not been completed, when the future discovery will not create a disputed issue of material fact. See A & B Discount Lumber & Supply, Inc. v. Mitchell, 799 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also Crespo v. Florida Entm’t Direct Support Org., Inc., 674 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (“A trial court has the discretion to deny a continuance of a summary judgment hearing where the outstanding discovery items are immaterial to the disposi-tive issues in the case.”). Here, future discovery would not yield any new…
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Barco Holdings, LLC v. Terminal Inv. Corp., 967 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…a. 3d DCA 2003). Further, “[a] trial court has the discretion to deny a continuance of a summary judgment hearing where the outstanding discovery items are immaterial to the dispositive issues in the case.” Crespo v. Fla. Entm’t Direct Support Org., 674 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). The only fact material to the default issue was whether Terminal had declared a default. Yet, there is no basis in the record upon which Barco could conclude that Terminal did declare a default. The affidavits from both Ter…
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Vancelette v. Boulan S. Beach Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 229 So. 3d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…he could not have completed the discovr: ery before the summary judgment hearing, particularly in light of her own notice of X’eadiness for trial months earlier and the lengthy pendency of the action. Crespo v. Fla. Entm’t Direct Support Org., Inc., 674 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Colby v. Ellis, 562 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Absent a non-moving party’s demonstration of diligence, good faith, and the materiality of the discovery sought to be completed, a trial court cannot be faulted for denying…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. George Azar, M.D., 648 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Tolar v. The Sch. Bd. OF Liberty Cnty., 398 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1981)
- Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972)
- Monroe Cnty. v. Pigeon KEY Historical Park, Inc., 647 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Colby v. Ellis, 562 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)