DARIN S. HOPPING, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Hopping appealed the denial of his rule 3.800 motion for post-conviction relief, challenging whether his 1992 resentencing—which increased his sentence in violation of double jeopardy principles but remained within statutory limits—constituted an illegal sentence. The court affirmed the denial but certified a question of great public importance regarding whether double jeopardy violations in sentencing are cognizable under rule 3.800.
The court affirmed the denial of the rule 3.800 motion based on Davis v. State's narrow definition of illegal sentence (one exceeding statutory maximums), but certified a question of great public importance regarding whether double jeopardy violations constitute illegal sentences under rule 3.800.
[1] A sentence that exceeds the maximum statutory period for an offense is an illegal sentence, regardless of sentencing guidelines.
[2] A sentence that violates double jeopardy principles is not necessarily an illegal sentence cognizable under rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines”
Davis v. State's definition of illegal sentence that the court applied to reject Hopping's claim
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Hopping received a 1992 resentencing following his rule 3.800 motion for post-conviction relief. The resentencing increased his sentence but…
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JOANOS, Judge.
This is an appeal from the denial of appellant’s rule 3.800 motion for post-conviction relief. One of the issues raised in the motion was whether appellant’s 1992 resentencing, which increased his sentence in response to his 1992 rule 3.800 motion for post-conviction relief, but did not exceed the statutory maximum, is an illegal sentence. We requested a response from the State on this issue, specifically on the effect of Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla.1973) (prohibiting increasing a legal sentence once it has commenced on double jeopardy grounds).
Citing the narrow definition of an illegal sentence in Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1995) (“an illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines”), the State explained in its response that while the resentencing violated double jeopardy, it did not result in an illegal sentence cognizable under rule 3.800. The state further asserted that appellant’s remedies were either a direct appeal of the 1992 order which resulted in resentencing, or a timely 3.850 motion. Our records indicate that appellant’s direct appeal following the 1992 resentencing was dismissed, and the two year bar for filing a 3.850 motion now applies.
We affirm based on Davis, but because of the nature of the issue, certify a question of great public importance.
“The prohibition against double jeopardy is ‘fundamental.’ ” Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla.1994), citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). “ ‘[T]he failure to timely raise a double jeopardy claim does not, in and of itself, serve as a waiver of the claim.’ ” Id. citing State v. Johnson, 483 So. 2d 420, 423 (Fla.1986).
In addition, this appears to be a situation in which the issue can be resolved as a matter of law without an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995).
Prior to Davis, this court determined that when only the sentence, not the conviction, is attacked as violating double jeopardy, the claim was cognizable as an illegal sentence under rule 3.800. See Jackson v. State, 650 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In Lee v. State, 667 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we recognized a possible distinction between the issue addressed in Davis, which involved the filing of contemporaneous written reasons for a guidelines departure sentence, and the particular sentencing situation involved in Lee. As in Lee, we certify a question of great public importance regarding the availability of a rule 3.800 motion in the present context:
WHETHER A SENTENCE WHICH VIOLATES DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRINCIPLES ACCORDING TO TROUPE v. ROWE, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla.1973), IS AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE COGNIZABLE UNDER RULE 3.800(a), FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE?
BOOTH, J., concurs.
BENTON, J., dissents with opinion.
BENTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The court today decides that appellant’s claim that his sentence was unconstitutionally lengthened, after he had begun serving it, cannot be considered under a rule that provides: “A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it-” Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.800(a). The opinion in Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1995) should not, in my opinion, be read so narrowly. A sentence that has been unconstitutionally enhanced, see Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla.1996); Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1994); Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla.1973); Merriman v. State, 671 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Hinton v. State, 446 So. 2d 712, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Royal v. State, 389 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Beckom v. State, 227 So. 2d 232, 233 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (citing Smith v. Brown, 135 Fla. 830, 832, 185 So. 732, 733 (Fla.1938)), is “an illegal sentence ... [in] that [it] exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines.” Davis, 661 So. 2d at 1196.
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Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…entenc-ing in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Thus, as Judge Benton concisely reasoned, the sentence should not be unreachable under a rule expressly intended to correct illegal sentences.... ” 708 So. 2d at 265; see also Hopping v. State, 674 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (Benton, J., dissenting). One should carefully compare the sentence not deemed illegal as double jeopardy in Callaway from the sentence deemed illegal as double jeopardy three years later in Hopping. The Callaway sentence i…
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Darin S. Hopping v. State, 708 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1998)…t public importance: WHETHER A SENTENCE WHICH VIOLATES DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRINCIPLES ACCORDING TO TROUPE v. ROWE, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla.1973), IS AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE COGNIZABLE UNDER RULE 3.800(a); FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE? Hopping v. State, 674 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the affirmative and quash Hopping. Darin Hopping pled guilty to a third-degree felony and was sentenced to a term of thirty months’ incarceration to be foll…1 / 2
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Skidmore v. State, 688 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…lea, the state would be permitted to reinstate all of the original charges and take him to trial. Jolly v. State, 392 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Furthermore, the double jeopardy claims may not be raised by a 3.800 motion, see Hopping v. State, 674 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); White v. State, 644 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), as they are cut off by the entry of the plea. Salazar v. State, 675 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Finding no error, we affirm. Affirmed. . The defendant was charged with b…
Authorities Cited (14 total)
- Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (U.S. 1969)
- Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1995)
- State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995)
- Flazell Troupe v. The Honorable Ellen Morphonios Rowe & the Honorable Paul Baker, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1973)
- Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996)
- State v. Johnson, 483 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1986)
- Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1994)
- Hinton v. State, 446 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Smith v. Brown, 135 Fla. 830 (Fla. 1939)
- Royal v. State, 389 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)