SAMUEL BRENT FASON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A sixteen-year-old defendant was charged with armed robbery based on incriminating statements made to police after arrest on another charge. The defendant had previously signed a form at a first appearance hearing explicitly refusing to be interviewed without his attorney present. The court reversed the denial of his motion to suppress, holding that the police violated his constitutional rights by interrogating him in disregard of his invocation of that right.
Yes. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The incriminating statements were obtained through police-initiated interrogation during custody on unrelated charges without counsel present and after the defendant had invoked his constitutional right to refuse interviews without an attorney, making the statements inadmissible.
[1] A defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is violated when police interrogate the defendant and elicit incriminating statements in disregard of a…
[2] A confession obtained by police-initiated interrogation during uninterrupted custody on unrelated charges, without counsel present and after an invocation of constitution…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The form clearly stated that he did not consent to be interviewed by any agent of the state concerning the then pending charge in that case or any other case. The form further stated that he did not consent to be interviewed by any law enforcement officer, state attorney, or state investigator concerning any matter without the presence of his attorney.”
Establishes the clear, express invocation of the right to counsel that the police subsequently violated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFason was arrested on a homicide charge and signed a Notification of Exercise of Rights form at his first appearance hearing, which stated he did not …
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PER CURIAM.
A direct-filed information charged the sixteen-year-old appellant with armed robbery. The information was based on incriminating statements he had made to law enforcement officers after his arrest on another charge. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress these incriminating statements. He then pleaded nolo contendere reserving his right to appeal the issue and was sentenced to eight years’ incarceration. He contends before us that his motion to suppress should have been granted because the police, interrogating him and eliciting the incriminating statements, violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. He bases his contention on the fact that the police interrogated him in disregard of a Notification of Exercise of Rights form he had signed two days earlier at a first appearance hearing on the other charge. We agree with his contention and reverse.
The appellant was first arrested on a homicide charge. The Notification of Exercise of Rights form both he and his attorney signed at the first appearance hearing on the homicide charge was filed in open court. The form clearly stated that he did not consent to be interviewed by any agent of the state concerning the then pending charge in that case or any other case. The form further stated that he did not consent to be interviewed by any law enforcement officer, state attorney, or state investigator concerning any matter without the presence of his attorney.
Two days after filing this form two Bartow police officers came to the juvenile detention center where he was being held on the homicide charge and, without notice to the appellant’s parents or his attorney, questioned him about an armed robbery. The appellant had not initiated the contact. The officers read him his rights and he signed a form waiving them. He then made the incriminating statements to the officers which were the subject of his motion to suppress.
The dispositive events of this case, although the charges are different, cannot be legally distinguished from State v. Guthrie, 666 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In Guthrie we held that the defendant’s confession, obtained by police-initiated interrogation during uninterrupted custody on unrelated charges without counsel present and after an invocation of constitutional rights had been signed, was properly suppressed. The trial court in the instant case erred in not also suppressing the statements at issue here which were obtained in the same manner. Because of its similar posture, like Guthrie, we certify conflict with Sapp v. State, 660 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Reversed and remanded.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and FRANK and BLUE, JJ., concur.
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Cullen v. State, 687 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…91), and a review of federal appeals court decisions following that case. The Second District, on the. other hand, in State v. Guthrie, 666 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), rev. granted, 677 So. 2d 841 (Fla.1996), and more recently in Fason v. State, 674 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), specifically disagreed with Sapp and held that a defendant could invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel while he was in custody regardless of whether interrogation was taking, or about to take, place. The court attributed th…
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Cullen v. State, 699 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1997)…PER CURIAM. We have for review the opinion in Cullen v. State, 687 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), which certified conflict with the opinions in State v. Guthrie, 666 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), and Fason v. State, 674 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. This Court recently quashed the decision of the district court of appeal in Guthrie. State v. Guthrie, 692 So. 2d 888 (Fla.1997); see Sapp v. State, 690 So. 2d 581 (Fla.1997)…
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State v. Martinez-Yanez, 701 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…BLUE, Acting Chief Judge. The State appeals an order granting the suppression of certain statements made by Pedro Martinez-Yanez. The order was based on the then controlling cases of Fason v. State, 674 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), and State v. Guthrie, 666 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court ruled to the contrary and disapproved Fason and Guthrie. See Sapp v. State, 690 So. 2d 581 (Fla.1997) (holding that an accused may n…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Guthrie, 666 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Sapp v. State, 660 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Cook v. Bill Royal Constr. Co., Inc., 660 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)