JOHN STROUD, INCAPACITATED, BY HIS MOTHER AND LEGAL GUARDIAN, PENNELOPE SCHUETTE, APPELLANT,
v.
JONATHAN R. STRAWN, POST, BUCKLEY, SCHUH & JERNIGAN, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION AND UNKNOWN OTHERS, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1996-06-12
No. 95-02685
FULMER and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.
675 So. 2d 646 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

John Stroud, a pedestrian struck by a pickup truck while crossing Ulmerton Road in Largo, Florida, appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of the driver and vehicle owner. The court reversed, holding that whether the driver exercised reasonable care presented a genuine issue of material fact unsuitable for summary judgment resolution.


Holding

Summary judgment was improper because reasonable people could disagree about whether the driver exercised reasonable care under the circumstances, making this a question for jury resolution rather than summary disposition.


Headnotes

[1] Summary judgment is inappropriate when the question of whether a driver exercised reasonable care under the circumstances is disputed and supported by witness testimony.

[2] Questions regarding reasonable care are typically jury issues when reasonable people could disagree on the outcome.

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Key Quotes

“In reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, we must view all of the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Establishes the applicable standard of review for summary judgment appeals

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Facts & Procedural History

At approximately 2:30-3:00 p.m. on a clear day, Stroud was crossing Ulmerton Road at its intersection with 38th Street. He waited at the roadway's rig…

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Opinion of the Court
RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.

RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.

John Stroud, by his mother and legal guardian, Pennelope Schuette, seeks review of a summary final judgment entered against him in his negligence action against the driver and owner of a pickup truck which collided with him while he was crossing Ulmerton Road. There were several witnesses to the accident. Given the number of witnesses and their testimony in the record, we conclude that the question of whether the driver exercised reasonable care under the circumstances was not conducive to resolution by summary judgment, and, therefore, we reverse and remand for a jury resolution of the lawsuit.

The incident occurred between 2:30 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. on a clear, sunny day. At the intersection of Ulmerton Road and 38th Street, Ulmerton Road has five westbound lanes: one right turn lane, three through lanes and one left turn lane. It is a busy, median-divided thoroughfare in Largo, Florida. The traffic was heavy; cars and trucks, backed up at the intersection, were waiting for a red light. The left turn light was green, and some traffic in the left turn lane had already progressed through the intersection. The driver had turned onto Ulmerton Road one-quarter mile from the intersection. He was traveling in the left turn lane and attempting to make the turn light to make a u-turn when he collided with the appellant. Witnesses testified that the appellant waited at the right side of the roadway before attempting to cross, then zigzagged across in a diagonal direction. Drivers in the right through lane and the left through lane observed the appellant watch for traffic and proceed across the lanes; they had no trouble seeing him. The appellant had proceeded across all but the left turn lane and was approximately ninety feet from the intersection when he started across the left turn lane. As the appellant stepped into the left turn lane, he was struck by the appellees’ pickup truck traveling at about thirty miles per hour. The appellant struck the truck’s windshield post. Neither the driver of the pickup truck, nor his two passengers saw the appellant prior to the impact.

In reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, we must view all of the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Athans v. Soble, 553 So. 2d 1361, 1362-63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The moving party must demonstrate conclusively that the nonmoving party cannot prevail. Wilson v. Woodward, 602 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Negligence is typically a jury issue. Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla.1985). Questions regarding reasonable care are issues upon which reasonable people could disagree, and, therefore, they are questions which should be resolved by a jury. Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So. 2d 1329, 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

There is record support for what the driver may or should have seen. Other drivers saw the appellant watching for traffic and crossing the road. One eyewitness gave the opinion that the driver was traveling too fast and not paying attention. The appellant had already crossed four lanes of traffic at the time of the collision.

The appellees rely in part on “darting out” cases where, typically, no witnesses observed the pedestrian, Preger v. Gomory, 55 So. 2d 541 (Fla.1951); Douglas v. Hackney, 133 So. 2d 301 (Fla.1961), or a sole witness saw the incident and knew that the impact was about to take place. Griffis v. Du Bow, 114 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). As in Nelson v. Ziegler, 89 So. 2d 780 (Fla.l956)(en banc), the record here shows that there is some proof that could allow a jury to conclude that the appellant’s perilous position in the street would or should have been known to the appellee in time for him to have avoided the injury if he had been keeping a proper lookout and, therefore, the proximate cause of the appellant’s injuries could have been the appellee’s failure to exercise reasonable care and caution. The appellant’s presence in the roadway for an extended period of time could give rise to a conclusion that both the appellant and the appellee had been in the roadway a sufficient period of time for each to have seen the other. See Gardella v. Stone, 507 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).

We, therefore, conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary final judgment for the appellees, and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FULMER and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Ondrey v. Patterson, 884 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1999). In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on Corporal Ondrey’s motion we are required to view all of the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the estate as the nonmoving party. See Stroud v. Strawn, 675 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). With respect to sovereign immunity, section 768.28(9)(a) provides the following: No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions shall be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defenda…
  • Valk v. J.E.M. Distribs. OF Tampa BAY, Inc., 700 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …g party. Athans v. Soble, 553 So. 2d 1361, 1362-63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The moving party must demonstrate conclusively that the nonmoving party cannot prevail. Wilson v. Woodward, 602 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).” Stroud by Schuette v. Strawn, 675 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Here, we agree with the trial court that under that standard, Valk, the moving party, was not entitled to summary judgment on KWPH’s defenses other than the res judicata defense. But neither did the undisputed facts conclus…
  • Buck-Leiter Palm Ave. Dev., LLC v. City OF Sarasota, 212 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)
    …ist, we must reverse the summary judgment. Atria Grp., LLC v. One Progress Plaza, II, LLC, 170 So. 3d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (quoting Knowles v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 994 So. 2d 1218, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)); Stroud by Schuette v. Strawn, 675 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (citing Athans v. Soble, 553 So. 2d 1361, 1362-63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)). In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court stated “that no contract was formed by virtue of the expired [IRA] and the subsequent [summary].”…

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