JEREMY E. LUNN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jeremy Lunn, a juvenile, appealed his burglary conviction and sentencing after pleading guilty. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial judge failed to ensure Lunn's waiver of a predisposition report was knowing and voluntary, and failed to comply with statutory requirements for imposing adult sanctions.
The waiver of the predisposition report was invalid because the trial judge failed to personally question the defendant or explain his rights under section 39.059(7), despite the defendant's written waiver. Additionally, the court failed to reduce its decision to impose adult sanctions to writing as required by statute, and failed to provide proper notice of probation conditions related to payment for drug and alcohol evaluation and treatment.
[1] A trial court must personally inform a juvenile of their rights regarding a predisposition report and confirm the waiver is knowing and voluntary before accepting a waive…
[2] A trial court's failure to ascertain if a juvenile's waiver of a predisposition report is knowing and voluntary requires remand for resentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 39.059(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), mandates that a judge consider a PDR before sentencing a youthful offender. The statute provides that a defendant may waive the report requirement, but the Florida Supreme Court has compelled the trial judge to inform the juvenile of his rights under the statute and to confirm that the juvenile understands the significance of the waiver.”
Establishes the statutory mandate for predisposition reports and the requirement for a knowing and voluntary waiver
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 10, 1995, Jeremy Lunn, a juvenile, entered a guilty plea to burglary and was sentenced to six months of community control with placement in a…
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FRANK, Judge.
On March 10, 1995, Jeremy Lunn, a juvenile, entered a plea of guilty to burglary and was placed on six months of community control with the condition of placement in the probation and restitution center, followed by eighteen months of probation. Prior to accepting the plea, the trial judge asked if Lunn wanted to waive his rights to a presen-tence investigation (PSI) and a predisposition report (PDR). After a short recess, the parties returned and the judge noted that the defendant had waived his right to a PDR. Although the defendant noted on the plea form that he had relinquished his right to a PDR, the judge did not ascertain whether Lunn’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.
Section 39.059(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), mandates that a judge consider a PDR before sentencing a youthful offender. The statute provides that a defendant may waive the report requirement, but the Florida Supreme Court has compelled the trial judge to inform the juvenile of his rights under the statute and to confirm that the juvenile understands the significance of the waiver. State v. Berry, 647 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1994).
In spite of the defendant’s execution of a written waiver, the trial judge’s failure to undertake the duty to question the defendant personally and to explain his rights under section 39.059 requires remand for resentencing. We also note that the court failed to reduce its decision to impose adult sanctions to a writing, as required by section 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), a defect that should be corrected on resentencing. Lunn has also raised questions about the conditions of his probation. On resentencing, the court may impose general conditions of probation without oral pronouncement, but the court must give the defendant oral notice of the conditions concerning payment for the evaluation and treatment of drug and alcohol problems. .§ 948.03(l)(k)(l), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994); State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1996).
Furthermore, before requiring the defendant to pay for investigative costs, the trial judge must ensure that the agency has made an appropriate request, with supporting documentation, for reimbursement. Jones v. State, 661 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
THREADGILL, C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur.
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B.B. v. State, 718 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…utes (1997). B.B. v. State, 647 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The requirement of a PDR may be waived, but only if a trial court informs the juvenile of his rights and confirms the juvenile understands the significance of the waiver. Lunn v. State, 675 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). The instant record does not demonstrate B.B. knowingly waived his right to a PDR. Therefore, we vacate B.B.’s commitment and remand for the trial court to consider a PDR before recommitting B.B., or to secure B.B.’s knowing waive…
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Smith v. State, 697 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ffense did not fall within the statutory provisions for sentencing a juvenile as an adult. § 39.022(5)(e)3, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992); State v. Berry, 647 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1994); Robinson v. State, 642 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see Lunn v. State, 675 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); B.B. v. State, 647 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on this claim. However, the trial court did not err in summarily denying Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistan…
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Parker v. State, 705 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…43.25(13), Florida Statutes (1995). The trial court also erred in its failure to require documentation from the State to prove its investigative cost of $100, or to consider Parker’s ability to pay. See § 939.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1995); Lunn v. State, 675 So. 2d 648, 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111, 116-117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)(en bane). Therefore, we strike the $2 cost and the $100 investigative cost. Conviction affirmed, $2 and $100 costs stricken. WHATLEY, J., concurs. ALTENBERND,…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1996)
- State v. Fletcher Berry, 647 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1994)
- Butler v. State, 661 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)